DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 061 734 24 EM 009 741

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|---|---|
| AUTHOR | Persico, Connell F.; McEachron, Norman B. |
| TITLE | Forces for Societal Transformation in the United States, 1950-2000. Volume I. |
| INSTITUTION | Stanford Research Inst., Menlo Park, Calif. |
| SPONS AGENCY | National Center for Educational Research and Development (DHEW/OE), Washington, D.C. |
| REPORT NO | EPRC-6747-12 |
| BUREAU NO | BR-7-1013 |
| PUB DATE | Sep 71 |
| CONTRACT | OEC-1-7-071013-4274 |
| NOTE | 128p. |
| EDRS PRICE | MF-$0.65 HC-$6.58 |
| DESCRIPTORS | American History; Changing Attitudes; Cultural Pluralism; Institutions; *Political Attitudes; Political Science; Power Structure; *Social Change; *Social Problems; Social Systems; Sociocultural Patterns; *Subculture |

ABSTRACT

A research study considers forces for social change in the United States from both a historical and contemporary standpoint. Beginning with a historical account of American radicalism from before the Revolutionary War through the 1950's to its re-emergence since 1954, particular emphasis is given to different facets of the student movement and "counter culture." A theoretical framework is set forth which considers indicators of structural and cultural transformation. Synchronization between values, institutions, and environment is seen as vital to national stability. Future change is discussed, and it is concluded that a successful response to future problems will require changes in central elements in the cultural value system and a transformation of the structure and purpose of many American institutions. (RB)

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# FORCES FOR SOCIETAL TRANSFORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1950-2000

## Volume I

*Research Note*
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

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*SRI Project 6747*

*September 1971*

*Educational Policy Research Center*

# FORCES FOR SOCIETAL TRANSFORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1950-2000

## Volume I

*Research Note*

*EPRC-6747-12*

*Historical Background, by* CONNELL F. PERSICO

*Theoretical Framework, by* NORMAN B. McEACHRON

*Prepared for:*

NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATIONAL
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
U.S. OFFICE OF EDUCATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20202

CONTRACT OEC-1-7-071013-4274

DRAFT

At what point then is the approach of danger to be expected? I answer if it ever reach us it must spring up amongst us; it cannot come from abroad. If destruction be our lot, we must ourselves be its author and finisher.

- A. Lincoln

Something is happening, but you don't know what it is
Do you, Mr. Jones?

- Bob Dylan

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# INTRODUCTION

Throughout American history there have been periods of social disruption in which the survival of the nation as a democratic entity seemed questionable. In retrospect those periods have come to be viewed as healthy and necessary agitation resulting in needed and beneficial reforms. They were a positive aspect of the historical development of the nation, and a cherished aspect of the concept of America.

As the nation moves closer to its two hundredth anniversary, it is in another period of disruption. What is most troubling about the present epoch is that, although its similarities to past periods give rise to some optimism, its differences from the past give rise to concern over the ability of established leadership to discern and respond effectively to the multiple crises leading to the disruption.

These differences between past periods and the present include at least the following.*

- A new set of actors
- A new, more comprehensive view of issues and their relationships
- A new set of societal transformations perceived as necessary
- A new set of techniques for bringing change about.

The depth of these differences raises the possibility that the disruption of the 1960s and the 1970s signify a fundamental cultural transition

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* Described and discussed more fully at the end of Section I, Historical Background.

rather than another set of limited reforms. Indeed, many observers--"Establishment" as well as radical--see the multiple issues of the agitation as arising from central thrusts of Western culture, rather than from simple institutional failings. It is because these differences and analyses are substantial enough to require consideration of a cultural transition as a possible and even plausible alternative future that the present study was undertaken.

This examination of contemporary forces for societal transformation consists of four major sections, the first two of which are published in this volume. The first is an historical account of American radicalism from before the Revolutionary War through the 1950s, and its re-emergence from 1954 to 1970 particularly in the different facets of the student movement or "counter culture." The second section sets forth a theoretical framework within which these and other indicators of structural and cultural transformation can be considered. In the third section, these indicators are applied to data for the United States since World War II with a view toward alternative interpretations. The last section draws out from these interpretations a plausible set of alternative future histories of America's next three decades, and concludes with some fruitful directions for research on the policy choices that these future histories suggest may be the most significant in the long run. Sections III and IV are being published as a separate volume.

Section I

# HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

by

Connell F. Persico

# I HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

## The Development of American Radicalism--1770 to 1950

Present day American radicalism, both in its philosophical outlook and its operational premises, has its roots in the ideological climate of the Revolutionary period of American history which culminated in the founding of the Republic. The statements on the rights of man drafted into the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States were derived from the most radical political doctrines of the mid-18th century. These documents represented not only a radical perspective on man and society, but as Staughton Lynd has said, "For almost two hundred years, American radicals have traced their intellectual origins to the Declaration of Independence and to the revolution it justified" (Ref. 1, p. 6).* The radicals' outlook and premises were "based on the more radical readings of the Declaration of Independence, which traced its intellectual ancestry more to (Thomas) Paine and Richard Price than to (James) Harrington and (John) Locke" (Ref. 1, p. 3).

### The Early Years

From the beginnings of the nation and through its history, American radicalism has provided an alternative perspective on the relationship of man and society. From pre-Revolutionary days to the present, the three axioms basic to that perspective have been the natural goodness and perfectability of man, man's inalienable free will and conscience,

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* The references are listed at the end of this volume.

and the priority of human rights over property rights. The radical contribution cannot be evaluated in terms of successful implementation of those axioms for, as Sidney Lens states,

> Never has the radical achieved anything approximating total victory--not even in the Revolution--but he has usually been able to modify restrictive institutions. Though his ultimate dream of the ideal society has not reached fruition, he sowed innumerable reforms which the reformer later reaped. In these victories lay both his fulfillment and his frustration (Ref. 2, p. 2).

Thus, the contribution of radicalism to America's social development remains substantial.

Radicalism, represented by such pre-Revolutionary personages as Thomas Paine and Samuel Adams, both fashioned and contributed to the development of the ideology underlying the Revolutionary War. In the period between the war and the Constitutional Convention of 1787, the radical movement sought to operationalize its axioms. The radicals strongly opposed the Constitution of 1787 which they viewed as a product of, by, and for the propertied classes. It was the radicals who insisted that the fundamental rights of man--for which the war had been fought and won, but which were not operationalized within the Constitution--be included in the Bill of Rights. This was a radical victory of substantial proportions.

During the formative years of the new nation, the radical position was reflected in the Jeffersonian belief in popular land ownership and agrarian democracy, as opposed to the Hamiltonian belief in commerce and industry as the pivot of economic development.

The Hamiltonian view became increasingly dominant as the nation moved further along the path of industry and commerce, and agrarian democracy began to lose ground. By 1816, Thomas Jefferson, who as President had overcome his misgivings about the factory system and centralism,

remarked that "experience has taught me that manufactures are now as necessary to our independence as to our comfort" (Ref. 2, p. 57). Thus, though the nation continued to believe in the ideal of the transcendence of human rights over property rights, in actuality, the reverse was to become increasingly true.

## Populism, Abolitionism, and Unionism

In the 19th century, three separate struggles in three different regions of the United States illuminated the effort to inculcate the primary axioms of radicalism into the nation's development. These conflicts, defined in class terms, formed the socioeconomic and political context of America in that century. In the West, the primary struggle was between debtors and creditors. Jacksonian democracy and populism represented the operational form of the radical perspective. In the South, the struggle over slavery highlighted abolition as the operational goal of the radical perspective. In the North, the radical perspective supported the development of unions, workers' parties, and utopian socialism in the struggle between industry's capitalists and workers.

Populism, which derived its primary impetus from the election of Andrew Jackson as President in 1828, is a recurrent theme and movement in American history. Andrew Jackson represented a new generation of radicals. He was the first President whose family held no property and the first President after Washington without a college education. He possessed a "taunting class consciousness" and refused to hide this commitment to the common man. He represented the left wing of the Democratic party--those who subscribed to the axioms of American radicalism. As President, Jackson extended the right to vote and began to pull into Democratic party ranks those from the West who regarded the government as the tool of Eastern money interests and those from the East who represented the emergent labor movement. His most radical act as President,

the vetoing of the bill to recharter the Bank of the United States in 1832, was stated with clear allegiance to radical axioms:

> It is to be regretted that the rich and powerful too often bend the acts of government to their selfish purposes . . . . When the laws undertake . . . to make the rich richer and the potent more powerful, the humble members of society, the farmers, mechanics, and laborers, who have neither the time nor the means of securing like favors to themselves, have a right to complain of the injustice of their government (Ref. 2, p. 80).

Populism, as the dominant radical thread, was submerged as the abolitionist movement gained prominence in the 1850s, but it has never been far below the surface of American political life. Several times in American history, populism re-emerges as a radical movement to redress the wrongs of the common man.

In the late 18th century, abolitionism reflected the stated goals of the American revolution.

> Therefore, paradoxical though it may seem, early abolitionists had little occasion to consider themselves, either ideologically or strategically, as revolutionaries. On the contrary, they advocated a program that was entirely consistent with the ideals of their society, as voiced by men in power, and their efforts encountered little articulated opposition (Ref. 3, p. 85).

It was only in the 19th century, with the rapid growth of capital, commerce, and industry, and the accompanying precedence of property rights over the revolutionary concerns of freedom, equality, and justice, that the abolitionists came to be regarded and to regard themselves as a radical movement.

The abolitionist movement, as measured in terms of the abolition of slavery and the freeing of slaves, generally is considered the most successful radical movement in America. Yet when measured against the movement's professed aim--the moral regeneration of America--abolitionism

represents the historical fate of radicalism: success in achieving significant reform, yet failure in achieving its basic aims.

The essence of the abolitionist movement was the moral regeneration of the nation, which would require freedom for the slave and recognition of his rights as a human being as the first step in a process of reaffirming a national commitment to the principles on which the nation was founded. Between 1800 and 1840, the abolitionist movement developed from its early belief that mere dissemination of antislavery ideas, accompanied by rational argument and education, would bring about emancipation to the belief that a fundamental readjustment in American life, requiring "Americans to undergo painful confrontations with themselves and with the realities of their society" (Ref. 3, p. 93), was necessary. By the 1830s, their agitation was so strenuous that there were anti-abolitionist riots, and the movement was considered dangerous and intolerable.

The movement had begun with an espousal of what were considered to be shared values and beliefs. Yet as the abolitionists attempted to operationalize these same values and beliefs, they concluded that a crucial change had occurred in the American people as a whole, and especially in public leadership. When this loss of faith occurred, "abolitionists adopted the mode of thought and the style of discourse that customarily is assumed by men who recognize themselves as displaced persons from an old order but advance agents of the new. They became revolutionaries" (Ref. 3, p. 86).

As the nation moved toward the Civil War, the idea of abolition of slavery became tenable. Following the Civil War, the movement for racial justice and moral regeneration lost momentum, as had populism before it. Yet the aims of the abolitionists remained prophetic. They, too, were

to resurface again in American history, with a new set of issues and a new relationship with the other radical movements.

The third struggle of American radicalism concerned the plight of the working class. In the 1800s, the movement to the cities had begun, thereby creating an industrial laboring class. As the factory system and capitalism developed, the problems for the working man multiplied. Among the most pernicious problems was unemployment, which left the worker with no means by which to meet his basic needs. As Lens reports:

> According to the editor of the Niles Register, a business publication, there was one pauper for every 250 people in 1815. During the depression that began four years later, there were 12,000 on the streets of New York alone; by 1845, it was estimated that 20 percent of the population of that city was in need of public charity. The specter of unemployment plagued the laborer from cradle to grave. Twenty thousand men and women, perhaps half the breadwinners, found themselves jobless in Philadelphia in the first great depression (Ref. 2, p. 63).

Many workers became preoccupied with discovering means by which to avoid or to escape such conditions. As early as 1792, the first unions had appeared in America but guilds had met with sharp condemnations by employers and repressive judicial decisions. These decisions defined joint requests for wage raises as "conspiracy" and of six such conspiracy trials from 1806 to 1815, four were decided against the unions. Although unions were eventually to outlast all other working-class institutions, they were premature in the early part of the 19th century.

> What was needed to contain the industrial monster, as some visionaries saw it, was something more meaningful than a few hours less work per day or a few pennies more in wages. What was needed was an image of a different kind of society, based on cooperation rather than individualism, love rather than profit--in a word, a utopia. Utopian ideas and utopian communities gripped the imagination of innumerable people in the

> first half of nineteenth-century America, forming a special chapter both in the history of radicalism and the nation (Ref. 2, p. 65).

In the 1820s, several utopian socialist communities were initiated. The most notable utopian socialists--Robert Owen, Fourier, Cabet--established, either directly or through disciples, communities that took their place beside the older religious and other American communes. "The communities themselves were isolated from American society and were usually short-lived; even the more successful ones came to grief in the industrial expansion after the Civil War" (Ref. 4, p. 19).

Despite their brief existence, these utopian experiments represented a significant thrust of American radicalism. The founding of communes was an alternative to violent action and preempted the strong move to sweep aside those in power by revolution. These communal experiments were the first time in U.S. history that radicals sought to make societal changes by example rather than by revolution.

In the late 1820s, the disillusionment with utopian communities coincided with the birth of the first labor parties in the world. These workingmen's parties "evolved from the crucible of labor-management conflict . . . (and) began with mundane grievances and worked (their) way towards the dream" (Ref. 2, p. 73). Whereas utopian socialism had made no class distinctions, the workingmen's parties were instruments for one class, the wage earners. These parties, concerned with reform of working conditions continued sporadically through the pre-Civil War period. However, it was only after the Civil War that large scale industrialization of America began and thus it was not until the late 1860s that union development accelerated, and the other struggles previously mentioned resurfaced.

For radicalism, the Civil War was the ending of one period and the beginning of another. Before the Civil War, American radicals could claim a legitimate status within the larger system because Jefferson, Jackson, Van Buren, and Lincoln had been associated with radical ideas. After the Civil War, despite several attempts by the dispossessed and social reformers to challenge dominant premises and beliefs, the United States was becoming a stable nation and was inhospitable to radicalism. Reform was considered legitimate only within the context of large scale industrialization, and radicals became outsiders. After 1865, the ultimate goal of a radical reconstitution of American society was considered subversive and un-American.

While the United States experienced growing stability, Europe was marked by instability. From the 1830s through the 1870s, Europe's upheavals produced spokesmen for a wide variety of social remedies. Of these, Karl Marx was to have the deepest affect on both European and American radicals. Before Marx, radical thought was generally "little more than an inchoate protest against injustice" (Ref. 2, p. 150). Marx's contribution was primarily intellectual, for he rooted the radical doctrine in history and economic theory, thereby removing it from its religious and humanistic origins and lending it an aura of science and sophistication. Although later developments brought some of Marx's concepts into question, during this early period of rapid industrialization the theories he proposed "freed socialism from its earlier situation of a doctrine cherished by conspirators in defiance of government and gave it at once a purpose and an historic background" (Ref. 2, p. 155).

Thus after 1870 radicalism assumed a different role in American history. Although the radical movement was part of and developed from the same roots that formed the American nation, the alien Marxist philosophy and the experience of exclusion from the mainstream were added.

The history of radicalism during the following 60 years was marked with conflict and repression as it attempted to achieve stature. The three streams of radicalism--populism, abolitionism, and unionism--identified different agents of capitalism--the banks, the railroads, the monopolies--as the sources of class conflict and economic and social inequality.

Populism re-emerged in the form of the National Independent (Greenback) Party in 1876 and the People's (Populist) Party in 1891. Through the Greenback Party, farmers attempted to reduce their debts by calling for the printing of more money. The Populist Party attempted to achieve the same aim by proposing that the Treasury Department provide an unlimited supply of gold and silver. In 1892, the Populists polled more than a million votes in the national election. However, since their electoral strength was weaker than their popular influence, they were unable to move the two major parties toward making concessions in their direction.

Populism also led to a revival of social criticism, which found its intellectual expression in the tracts and journals of the political parties mentioned above, as well as in such writings as Henry George's Progress and Poverty (1897), Edward Bellamy's Looking Backward (1888), and H. D. Lloyd's Wealth Against Commonwealth (1894). These contributions to social thought lived on after the Populist political movements died and helped to form the context for new progressive parties, which later included the organizations of industrial workers.

The abolitionists maintained their position during the Reconstruction period and concentrated their energies on writing safeguards into the Constitution for the Negro's new status. The Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendmends were the results. In 1874, abolitionists from all over the nation met for a final reunion and concluded that the

abolitionist revolution had yet to achieve its aim, i.e., the eradication of caste and class distinction in the nation. Meanwhile, unionism and political movements became the predominant means by which radicals hoped to achieve the transformation of society. After 1870, industrial development and the accompanying national growth and wealth, were astonishing. The nation viewed with pride the rate of economic development. At the time of the Civil War, the United States ranked fourth among industrial nations. By 1894 it had surpassed all rivals, accounting for one-third of the world's output of manufactured goods. American factories, whose owners had been in awe of British capacity at the beginning of the 19th century, were now fabricating twice as many wares as the previous world leader. The industrial boom attracted 5.5 million immigrants to the country in ten years, and increased the number of workers in manufacturing from less than 3 million to almost 6 million. Railway mileage almost doubled, so that the United States had more track than all of the European countries combined. Production of coal, iron, and steel, and the rate of capital investment, were sensational enough to make a "business publicist light up like a glowworm" (Ref. 2, p. 171).

There was, of course, another side to this growth and wealth, which critics of the time called "the new feudalism." Far from guaranteeing social justice, these developments produced a widening and embittering inequality. Some of the grim statistics include:

- A decline in per capita income of 20 to 25 percent for period 1870 to 1883.
- More than one million children working (one-sixth of the total work force).
- More than one million workers lost their jobs in the recession in the early 1880s
- Wages were cut another 15 percent, as a result of that downturn.

Within this context, labor organizations and third political parties developed. During the 1886 election, independent political parties operated in 13 states and labor tickets were put forth in 59 cities. Paralleling this development was the growth of two major organizations--the Knights of Labor and the American Federation of Labor. Also, there were spontaneous and semispontaneous eruptions such as the Homestead and Pullman strikes, and the march on Washington by Jacob Coxey's army.

By 1890, the radicals concluded that a social sense of desperation was necessary for generating mass-based social change. Partially on the basis of that conclusion, and partially because it was an effective means for making demands, the strike became the major weapon of labor. Whereas "between 1865 and 1881 there had been less than five hundred walkouts, from 1881 to 1905 there were no less than thirty-eight thousand, involving seven and a half million laborers" (Ref. 2, p. 187). The giant industries reacted to strikes with firm resistance; the result was an unprecedented scale of industrial violence. Figures are fragmentary, but a survey by Outlook magazine in 1904 gives some idea of the extent of the phenomenon: "In the thirty-three months prior to the survey--not a particularly exceptional period--198 men were killed on picket lines in thirty states, 1,966 injured, 6,114 arrested" (Ref. 2, p. 187).

Despite the violence, there was considerable growth in union membership during the first two decades of the 20th century. Simultaneously, many of the internal conflicts of the union movement were polarized and then resolved. At the extremes of the union movement were the American Federation of Labor (AFL) and the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW). The issues around which the polarity occurred were capitalism, political action, confrontation and violence, and loyalty and subversion.

The IWW was the extreme radical wing of the labor movement and its demise following World War I represented the beginning of the end of

radical attempts to transform society along socialist and anarchic lines. Sidney Lens captures the spirit of the IWW in the following description:

> It was a revolutionary union, formed in 1905, that answered fire with fire, gunshot with gunshot, and wore overalls as a badge of honor. No radical force in American history has been so earthy, so wedded to its beloved proletariat. The Wobblies rode the rods, tramped the roads, marched off to jail defiantly. They fought and they sang, and their songs were eloquent testimonials to a direct-action credo which anyone with a fourth-grade education could understand. Their lyrics had both the bite and the tang of America, eschewing all circumlocutions and vagaries (Ref. 2, p. 220).

This revolutionary spirit was countered by severe repression. Harassment, accusations, arrests, and trials became commonplace occurrences for IWW members. "The campaign of repression reached a climax during World War I, when almost the entire leadership of the IWW was accused and convicted of conspiracy against the war effort" (Ref. 5, p. 12). The disintegration of the IWW cleared the path for a successful accommodation between labor and management within the context of capitalism.

The other major form of radicalism in this period was the growth of the Socialist Party under the leadership of Eugene Debs. Gaining strength primarily from the labor unions and a large group of prominent intellectuals, the party received more than 900,000 votes, or 6 percent of the national poll, in the 1912 election. It was the largest leftist party in the history of the United States. "At one time there were 1,039 Socialist Party members holding public office, including 56 mayors, one congressman, and 300 local aldermen" (Ref. 2, p. 210). The party decided to work for realizable reforms by making immediate demands. It was thought that only through the experience of unionism and strikes would a worker come to understand the inherent link between his demand for higher wages and the ultimate need for the abolition of the wage

system. However, the Socialist Party declined with the improved economic conditions created by World War I.

World War I and the Russion Bolshevik Revolution helped to create a strong antiradical, antisocialist, antipacifist current in the country. The result was repression of radicalism, the most famous case being that of Tom Mooney. The conduct of Mooney's San Francisco trial in 1917 later led to a conviction among millions of people--including Governor Whitman of New York and President Wilson--that Mooney was convicted solely because of his radical views. The Espionage Act was passed by the Congress in 1917 and "was directed not so much against spies . . . as against the radicals" (Ref. 2, p. 251). In addition to the federal legislation:

> Many states enacted their owr criminal-syndicalism laws, abridging the vaunted rights of free speech and assembly. Not by accident the first such bills were introduced in Idaho and Minnesota, where the IWW was engaged in extensive unionizing drives. Nor was this all. The nation was in such an ugly temper that authorities not only winked at extralegal action but often encouraged it. In June 1917, for instance, several hundred sailors from the Bremerton Yards were permitted time off by their officers to wreck the IWW headquarters in Seattle. In November, seventeen IWW members, deported out of town by the Tulsa police, were seized by a masked mob, beaten, tarred and feathered, and left half dead. Local store windows carried posters: "I.W.W. Don't let the sun set on you in Tulsa." Soldiers and sailors raided the Socialist office in Boston. Armed businessmen and mine executives corralled twelve hundred striking Wobblies in a ball park at Bisbee, Arizona, loaded them into cattle cars and sent them headlong into the desert (Ref. 2, p. 252).

This mood of repression swept beyond the radicals to include pacifists and liberals. Populist groups, antiwar professors, German farmers, and others were arrested or beaten. A high point was reached with the arrest of Eugene Debs in June 1918. The ten-year sentence he received for violation of the Espionage Act was sufficiently repelling to many people as to give impetus to the antiwar movement.

## After World War I

The end of the war naturally led to the end of the antiwar militancy but economic factors re-emerged to maintain the thrust of radicalism. Further inequities produced by the war and the postwar economic situation enabled the radical movement to regroup. From 1919 to 1922, there were almost 8.5 million pickets. "In 1919 alone, one-seventh of the working class was on strike" (Ref. 2, p. 258). Strikes were a recurring tactic of radicals in the pursuit of greater economic equality.

Independent political parties also re-emerged in this period. This time they were joint farmer-labor political ventures. Concentrated in the Midwest and Northwest, they achieved their greatest strength in the presidential election of 1924. Robert LaFollette, a candidate of the Progressive Party, received almost 5 million popular votes and 12 electoral votes.

After that strong showing, radicalism appeared to lose its way as the nation moved into a brief era of prosperity. Then the Bolshevik revolution entrenched itself in Russia. Radicials redirected their attention to the tenets and strategies of a worldwide socialist revolution. "Bolshevism, it seemed to many, would become a unifying force for a new Left, surging to state power" (Ref. 2, p. 263). Sidney Lens describes the new phase, the new impetus and elan of radicalism:

> The generation of radicals of the post-World War I era, like its predecessors, was a blend of idealists and malcontents seeking the beautiful tomorrow. If it were dissimilar in any way, it was only because of its conviction that the revolution--at last--was close at hand. It was no longer a haze in the distance, as it had been for previous well-meaning leftists, but a delineated vision coming into immediate focus. It was already a reality in Russia; it had almost succeeded in Germany and Hungary; it could no longer be held back. The young radicals who became the core of the Communist Party were determined, therefore, to put an end to looseness and temporization.

> If you were going to storm the barricades, you had to have military discipline, clarity on minute details, a total unity of purpose. You could no longer leave the task of revolution to a generation of middle-aged men who tended to weaken under fire, to look for compromises and accommodations. Thus it was that temperament, as much as ideas, became a determinant of radical inner life (Ref. 2, p. 265).

Perhaps unavoidably, overseas influences were helping to form the character of the American left wing. The influx of 13 million immigrants to the United States from 1900 to 1914 had the effect of altering the composition of the Socialist Party and other radical movements. From the end of World War I until the New Deal program was initiated, the major radical movement in America was communism. However, in its first decade in America, communism failed in its attempt to be a radical movement or a basis for labor agitation. The depression of 1921 to 1922 that caused 5 million additional persons to be unemployed and a decline in wages of from 20 to 25 percent, resulted in no substantial demonstrations or a radical upsurge. Capitalism came back from that depression with an unprecedented growth rate.

It was a time of optimism and self-assurance. Only the trial, conviction, and execution of Sacco and Vanzetti generated any substantial protest. The 1930s and the Great Depression were needed to provide radicalism with the means to organize and develop a new direction:

> Radicalism's "lost decade"--the Golden Twenties--was followed by what Eugene Lyons, a former Moscow correspondent, called the "Red Decade." It was not Red in the sense that councils of workers and peasants took over the government, or that, as rightists argued after 1933, a socialist upstart was ensconced in the White House. But it was Red in the sense that the center of political gravity swung sharply to the Left, and millions of jobless, war veterans, and mass industry workers took to the streets in demonstrations or "seized" factories in sit-down strikes. It was Red in tone, mood, flavor as thousands of artists, intellectuals, movie stars, and literary figures found an emotional haven with various radical parties.

> As suddenly as the prosperity of the Golden Twenties turned into the stock market collapse of Black Thursday, the fortunes of the American Left began to soar, until by the mid-1930s, it reached new peaks comparable to 1912 (Ref. 2, p. 297).

Despite the swing to the left, the path for radicals was not an easy one. Through demands for relief and unemployment insurance, which did not exist at the time, radicals were able to build a new base for their movement. The backbone of the movement was the unemployed, and with that base secured, radicalism extended itself to veterans, blacks, and unionists. The organizations of veterans were most threatening to national leadership; the ex-soldiers were more than just unemployed--they had military training. Until this time, blacks had comprised an untapped reservoir of protest. The effect of the depression on blacks was to accentuate how small their gains had been since the Civil War. The Scottsboro case of 1931 to 1936 moved the issue of Negro rights to a high priority in radical ranks. Unions continued to create pressure for recognition and the right to bargain collectively. The longshoremen's strike on the West Coast in 1934 and the formation of the Congress of Industrial Organization (CIO) were the major labor developments in the mid-1930s.

The election of Franklin D. Roosevelt and the successful development of the New Deal program all but obviated the radical movement. When World War II finally eliminated large scale unemployment and depression, the left had lost its motive force.

After the war, there was an unprecedented outburst of strikes but the postwar depression that radicals had anticipated did not materialize. The last great postwar attempt to revive radicalism was the formation of the Progressive Party and the presidential campaign of Henry Wallace in 1948. Wallace's poor showing was a shattering setback for American radicalism in general and the American Communist Party in particular.

The communists faced a period of repression that was much longer, although considerably milder, than the one after World War I. History seemed to bypass American radicalism. No longer would economic issues alone suffice for ". . . poverty per se . . . was no longer the main lever for building a radical movement . . . . If an insurgent impulse, as C. Wright Mills called it, was to revive radicalism anew, it would come from other causes than poverty" (Ref. 2, p. 351).

The 1960s and 1970s have seen the adoption of several noneconomic causes as motive forces for radical activity including racism, militarism, war, alienation, and oppression. Radicals today have again assumed their historical role in relationship to these problems. As Sidney Lens suggests:

> In the final analysis there are only three ways of effecting social change: through persuasion of the men who hold power in the existing system, through a conspiratorial coup d'etat, or through the open mobilization of the people against the prevailing order. The first is the technique of liberals, the second of one type of anarchist, the third of most other radicals (Ref. 2, p. 357).

Radical activity in the period 1954 to 1970 has adopted this last technique as a principal thrust, yet this period has significant differences as well as similarities to previous periods of American radicalism. Thus to illuminate the differences and similarities for subsequent study and interpretation, we must analyze in detail the historical development and the multiple manifestations of the most recent radical movement for social change.

## The Contemporary Counterculture--1954 to 1970

In recent years there has been an accelerating growth of political and social disorder in the United States. The disorder has taken many forms and directions, yet has found its clearest articulation in what Theordore Roszak has called "the counter culture" (Ref. 6), defined as the culture of the segment of the population (primarily youth) that has adopted a set of values and beliefs standing in apparent contradiction to the dominant operational values of contemporary American society.

This counterculture or subculture includes persons who are popularly referred to as revolutionaries, radicals, reformers, hippies, dropouts, black militants, and members of the Third World. There are three demands or force components of their revolutionary thrust:

(1) Social justice and equality

(2) An expansion of human awareness and consciousness

(3) The development of cultural pluralism.

These forces find their expression in two different, yet interrelated ways: (1) in relation to different specific issues, activities, and events; and (2) through a conceptual frame work or ideology that emphasizes the synthesis of experience.

### Explanations and Hypotheses

Having identified some of the types of persons involved, it is appropriate to note here some of the popular explanations of, and empirical research on, the youth culture. The popular explanations include the theories of the natural rebelliousness of youth, a rebellion against affluence, the outside conspiracy theory, moral reaction against the Vietnam war, prolonged adolescence, Oedipal rebellion, Spockian permissiveness,

and historical irrelevance. Kenneth Keniston (Ref. 7, p. 25) has synopsized some of the tentative empirical findings:

> The counter culture's tendencies toward militancy, anger, and dogmatism, although existing, have been exaggerated. (Keniston's own observation)
>
> Idealists predominate even among the purportedly obscene, destructive, and nihilistic students. (Robert Liebert)
>
> Moral issues are at the heart of student revolt. (Brewster Smith)
>
> Politically active left-wing students come from liberal and politically active families. (S. M. Lipset)
>
> Permissiveness is not a determining variable of activism. (Norma Haan and Jeanne Block)
>
> Activists come from families that place relatively great emphasis on intellectualism, romanticism, and humanitarianism. (Richard Flacks)
>
> Activists who hold values that are in concert with their parents and activists who experience a discontinuity of values with their parents form two subgroups of activists which utilize different methods of expression. (Jeanne Black)
>
> The socialization experiences reported by protestors emphasize training for independence. (Brewster Smith)

Based on these empirical findings, Keniston has developed a set of hypotheses:

> Student activists come from a highly principled family culture that is transmitted to the children through reasoning and persuasion, and the encouragement of independence in thought and action.
>
> Studies of student activism show a relative predominance of positive feelings, positive identification, and basic value continuity.
>
> The study of student activism exposes the ideological bias and theoretical inadequacy of many of the concepts (e.g., socialization and acculturation) by which we have attempted to understand the relationship of men to politics and society.

> Psychological explanations alone are not adequate to understand today's student radicals: student radicalism has developed within a social, cultural and, above all, a political context.

Keniston's hypotheses, while presenting a different and positive set of assertions about a large part of the counterculture, fail to address one of its major aspects: Both his research and the popular explanations treat the emergence of black and Third World radicalism as phenomena separate and distinct from the main thrust of the counterculture.

However, as the following analysis will illustrate, the Civil Rights movement of the late 1950s and early 1960s, and the development of the black perspective within it, form much of the context for the emergence and development of the entire counterculture. This analysis of contemporary radical forces, as expressed through the evolution of the counterculture, strongly suggests that the counterculture did not evolve mainly from the psychological makeup of the participants, but rather it developed in direct relationship to the social and political context of modern American society. These two competing interpretations of contemporary radicalism (the psychological and the political) lead to vastly differing national policy recommendations.

## A Suggested Rationale

Contemporary radical forces are discussed here in the context of Figure 1, a diagram indicating the different possible states of mind that individuals may have with regard to their felt need for action, and the transitions that seem to have taken place as influenced by recent events. The current situation of widespread civil dissidence is thus viewed as involving numerous actors who hold different attitudes regarding desirable action to improve the lot of subjugated or underprivileged groups in the society or to effect societal and moral reform.

MAIN POLITY




FIGURE 1 STATES OF MIND IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL CHANGE

The essential concept of the diagram is that, as a result of a person's experiences, he may shift from one attitude or state of mind to another. Alternative policies may affect the probabilities of such shifts in different ways, and thus may contribute to the bringing about of alternative futures (discussed later in this paper).

No Special Action Required--The box at the top of the diagram represents the main body of the population, out of which the primary actors in the revolutionary drama are drawn. It comprises a wide range of positions along the dimension inert-unconcerned to active-concerned, and also along the dimension liberal to conservative. The basic characteristic of this large populace is that it believes no special action is required--progressive social change is taking place at a safe and appropriate rate, and normal political institutions and processes are adequate for the accomplishment of desirable change.

This state of mind is reflected in the historical events of the post-World War II period. The general state of mind was one of security and stability, as reflected in and possibly resulting from the election of Dwight Eisenhower (1951), the end of the Korean conflict (1952), the censuring of Senator Joseph McCarthy (1954), the attempts at stabilizing the economy, and the characterizing of the then youth population (especially college students) as the "silent generation."

Acceleration of Social Change--In the area of civil and human rights, the acceleration of social change began with the Brown versus Board of Education decision of the U.S. Supreme Court, in May 1954. This action was the result of a state of mind characterized by the conceptualization of serious inequities and inhumanities within American society. Implicit in that conceptualization was the assumption that the declared national goals of social equality and justice were genuine and that "legitimate"

political processes were adequate to accomplish desirable change. Thus, the major forms of political activity were litigation in the courts and enforcement of the new legal statutes through the federal judicial process.

The period 1954 to 1960 also marked the beginning of direct and aggressive civil rights actions--for example, the Montgomery bus boycott in 1955--on the part of a segment of the populace. The actors in this drama were federal officials, southern Negroes, and northern "liberals." Legal and judicial actions also were evident, including the banning of racial segregation on public transportation by the Supreme Court (1956), the forced integration of southern schools (1956), and the Civil Rights Act of 1957.

During the period 1960 to 1964, new actors, new forces, and new activity developed at an increased tempo. Students in the North and South emerged as a new major active group and changed the perception of the situation. The major assumptions of this new group were that direct activity and involvement of masses of people were needed to bring about social change, and that there was a need for widespread communication of activity and response.

These assumptions reflect the re-emergence of a traditional form of political activism. Mass participation and the demands for political and judicial support of civil rights and civil liberties are in the tradition of radical movements throughout American history. The combination of moral concern and political activity reflect the tradition and perspective.

Some of the relevant events that occurred in this period include the lunchcounter sit-in movement (1960); the emergence of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, and Freedom Rides (1961); the Civil Rights Act (1960); the March on Washington (1963); the Voting Rights Act (1964); the Supreme Court "one man, one vote" decision (1964); and the Economic Opportunity Act (1964).

Paralleling these rapid developments in civil rights was the acceleration of social change in the areas of civil liberties and foreign policy. This acceleration, which was centered on college campuses in the North, reflected not only a demand for international and individual justice and equality, but a growing consciousness and awareness by the young of a variety of social problems around them. They displayed their concern and protest in ways that assumed the "legitimate" political processes were adequate to accomplish the desirable changes. They picketed the northern branches of major department stores that pursued a segregation policy in the South (1960); protested against the execution of Caryl Chessman and favored abolishing capital punishment (1960); demonstrated in San Francisco against the House Committee on Un-American Activities (1960); and protested against the breaking of diplomatic relations with Cuba (1961), the State Department ban on general travel to Cuba (1961), the Bay of Pigs invasion (1961), and the Cuban missile blockade (1962).

Resistance to the Acceleration of Social Change--Throughout the decade of 1954 to 1964, there was also resistance to the acceleration of social change. In the realm of civil rights, this resistance was centered in many of the legally constituted state and local authorities, as well as in the organized illegal and extra-legal groups. The dominant perception of the situation appears to have been that the federal government was interfering in state and local affairs and that civil rights advocates were breaking the established local laws. Therefore, resistance was viewed as necessary to preserve law and society. Some of the events which took place that demonstrate the attitudes of this state of mind include the organization of the first White Citizens Council (1954); the kidnapping and lynching of Emmett Till (1955); the bombing of the home of the Reverand Martin Luther King, Jr. (1956); riots at the University of Alabama resulting from the admission of Autherine Lucy (1956); a manifesto by

southern legislators denouncing the Brown versus Board of Education decision (1956); the closing of schools in Little Rock, Arkansas (1958); the abandoning of the Prince Edward County, Virginia, public school system (1959); mass arrests of demonstrators (1960 on); "token" integration plans (1962); the assassination of Medgar Evers (1963); the killing of four black girls in the bombing of a church in Birmingham, Alabama (1963); and the execution of Schwerner, Chaney, and Goodman at the beginning of the Mississippi Summer Project (1964).

One piece of evidence that demonstrates the strength of the resistance to school integration is the statistical data on integration of schools in the southern and border states. By 1963, 9.2 percent of black youth attended integrated schools in the border states, while only 1.2 percent of black youth attended them in the South. It is apparent that the Brown versus Board of Education decision was resisted successfully for a prolonged period of time.

Even the apparent success of the sit-in movement in integrating public facilities had certain costs that demonstrated the ability of the forces of resistance to circumvent the legal statutes. Although the sit-in movement, operating on the basis of legal statutes, had desegregated one or more establishments in 108 southern cities, 3,600 participants had been arrested on the basis of such local statutes as trespassing.

On the issues concerning international affairs and essentially "moral" questions, different forms of resistance, essentially attitudinal, occurred. There were two such forms, one of which can be called official indifference or a "bureaucratic" attitude. Demands for change were either ignored or resisted and the person being asked to make the change let it be known that he had no final authority or responsibility for making such decisions. It was the "bureaucrats" who first articulated the theory that the system itself was responsible for immobility

and resistance to change. Such responses to demands appear to have been commonplace in the embryonic student movement and its involvement with local administrators and lower level bureaucrats.

The other form of subtle resistance was the conscious distortion of truth. The U-2 incident in 1960 demonstrated an apparent willingness (albeit a seeming necessity) on the part of the government to distort the truth. The "payola" scandal of the late 1950s was interpreted by many as an example of media techniques that lead to a falsified picture of reality.

It was from such incidents as these that many young people decided to develop an expanded consciousness and awareness as a necessary part of their growth. This experimentation, which over time made use of new media, new language, new forms of experience, and marijuana and other drugs, was viewed as a paramount necessity for survival in a seemingly indifferent and distorted world.

What may have been the most critical period in this nation's history since the Great Depression developed as a result of the interplay between the acceleration of change and the resistance to it. The period 1964 to 1966 sharpened psychological, social, political, and cultural schisms within the nation.

Loss of Faith--It was in the period 1964 to 1966 that the "conceptual revolution" gained its foothold. An increasing loss of faith in the ability of the legitimate political processes to meet the growing demands for change was experienced. The traditional sense of community (shared values, traditions, and outlook) and the overculture which seemed to bind the nation's people together were shattered. The causes are to be found in some of the events of that period, the life-experiences of many youth, and the growing sense of inability to effect changes in the directions in which

America seemed to be moving. As a result, some fundamental concepts came into question: the concepts of community, of law and justice, and of democracy.

For the thousands of students who had been arrested or jailed in civil rights demonstrations and for their supporters, the prevailing interpretations of law and crime were no longer tenable. In the view of those arrested and jailed, their actions were taken to uphold and to enforce one of the laws of the land--integration. This view also applied in other situations. It led to new analyses of the problems and social situation in America, which inevitably led to new conceptions for effecting and directing social change.

These conceptual changes and problem redefinitions were hastened by three major events in 1964. In August, the actions of the Democratic National Convention were felt by the students and their sympathizers to represent a "test" of whether that party and the political system would respond to its stated objectives. The challenge of the "regular" Mississippi delegation by the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party was based on constitutional guarantee of political participation and on the one man, one vote principle. As the Skolnick Report states:

> Faith in the political process, and especially in the traditional alliance between blacks and the liberal elements in the Democratic Party, suffered another blow in the failure to seat the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party delegation at the 1964 Democratic convention. The MFDP represented both a rejection of Southern White-only Democratic politics and a fundamental belief in the good offices of liberal Democrats, whose compromise offer of two seats among the regular Mississippi delegation was seen as an insult (Ref. 8, pp. 134-35).

The 1964 presidential election brought the problem of Vietnam to the forefront in America. Lyndon Johnson pledged that there would be no further escalation of the war. Even the Students for a Democratic Society

supported the President in that election. When the United States began to bomb North Vietnam in February 1965, it was a crushing blow both to the young people who had believed the promises and to the apparent national consensus that had developed opposing further escalation of the war.

In October 1964, the Free Speech Movement erupted at the University of California, Berkeley. The FSM symbolized an end to the belief that the American dream could be realized under existing societal and political arrangements. The FSM developed out of what were considered unjust and oppressive regulations imposed on students by university officials, but quickly became a national symbol of resistance to and rebellion against the dominant priorities, beliefs, and values of American society ("It is time to throw our bodies upon the cogs and wheels of the machine, and bring it to a grinding halt"--Ref. 9).

It was in this climate that there emerged two new perspectives that would affect strongly the future development of the counterculture, as well as the dominant culture itself. Those two perspectives were the black and Third World perspective and the "transcendental perspective."

The black and Third world perspective evolves first from the experiences of young blacks in the Civil Rights movement, and addresses itself to the nature of American society and culture. The most important basic premise underlying this perspective is the belief that the society is racist and oppressive in that it purposely (albeit partly unconsciously) excludes, on the single factor of race, a large group of people from the values and cultural patterns of the society: It denies them their dignity, their common and individual humanity, and their sense of personal worth. This group of people thus exists as a colony of a mother country that constantly oppresses and exploits it. Their only value as people is that which the colonial power allows them and deems as necessary to continue their passive subservience. But man's purpose

is to become conscious and aware of his personal and cultural dignity and, in the process, to develop the knowledge and skills necessary to overthrow the oppression.

This perspective gained articulation in the writings of several black authors and activists including Malcolm X, Frantz Fanon, Eldridge Cleaver, Huey Newton, LeRoi Jones, Stokely Carmichael, and others, and an operative base in such organizations as the Black Panther Party and Black Student Unions. It has been extended and adopted by the emerging Chicano movement which, although accelerating later than the black movement, is rapidly gaining intensity and articulation.

The "transcendental perspective" evolves from the experiences of a vast array of young people, who in the climate of lost faith began to experiment extensively with marijuana, psychedelics, and other "consciousness-expanding" experiences such as meditation, yoga, "sensory awareness," and so on. The most important basic premise underlying this perspective is that existing social problems and the accompanying oppression are symptomatic of a materialist based consciousness that gives priority to property over people and to the rational over the spiritual. Such consciousness and the systems based on it alienate people from their real selves and their common humanity. By expanding his consciousness and awareness, man can transcend the narrow limits of present consciousness and its accompanying systems. This perspective is supported and supplemented by the "human potential movement," which began in 1961 with Esalen Institute programs, and by the "humanistic" branch of the discipline of psychology.

The combination of these perspectives and the events described above contributed to a profound estrangement with the existing social and cultural order and to a series of "tests" of the willingness and ability of the system to change itself or to demonstrate its responsiveness. The "tests" have ranged from single-issue incidents to lengthy experiments

equality, and human dignity remained intact, but the differences in both the needs and goals of the different action groups were recognized. As this pluralism was developing, a new set of events occurred that involved more people in the movement of the counterculture and established a new context of "testing." This acceleration of loss of faith occurred with the U.S. invasion of Cambodia (1970) and the subsequent deaths of college students on the campuses of Kent State University and Jackson State College (1970). Until these events, there was a clearly discernible "radical element" on campuses around the nation, often assumed to number only two to five percent of all college students. After these events, a near-majority of college students appears to have been reflective of the counterculture.

Thus, a new and larger wave of students has become involved in testing the ability of the system to change itself. In May 1970 they began a process of university "reconstitution" and of active interest in electoral politics; however, before the actual testing of these methods, the new group of students experiencing a loss of faith appear to have given up on them. At the end of 1970, there was a noticeable lack of organized counterculture activity on behalf of any issue. Simultaneously there was a rapid rise in underground and guerilla type tactics, and three new mind states, which can be described as results of the loss of faith.

Destroy the System--The first of these three states of mind sees the resolution of the social ills and problems of America in the destruction of the present political system, both in form and content. These radical actors have concluded that the present societal conditions readily fit such "foreign" analytical models and ideologies as Marxism. Given this class-based economic analysis, the economic system and its political supporters are viewed as the root cause of social problems. It follows that the government must be overthrown by force and the power seized by a revolutionary vanguard. The belief is that no substantial change can occur

and innovations. They have led to what is at present a multidimensional movement, each component of which views the "tests" differently and, therefore, approaches them, evaluates them, and acts on their results differently.

A list of the major "tests" since 1964 would include ghetto uprisings (1964-66), Stop the Draft Week (1967), the development of campus-community organization programs (1965), experimental colleges and free universities (1966), Work-Study Programs (1967), the development of the Haight-Ashbury community (1965), the emergence of a national Students for a Democratic Society (1967), the articulation of the concept of black power (1966), major confrontations between students and police on campuses (1967-69), student strikes (1968-69), Peace and Freedom parties (1968), the Eugene McCarthy campaign (1968), the Democratic Party convention (1968), and the Moratorium demonstrations (1969).

On the basis of these "tests," the counterculture reached certain tentative conclusions about the direction of American society and, therefore, the possible directions of its own developing movement.

It was believed by the counterculture that the election of Richard Nixon as President signalled a swing to the right in terms of national politics that would be reflected at all levels of government. The counterculture viewed this conservative swing as the initial step in the direction of repression and it became concerned about the possibilities that a cadre of political prisoners would be created, that the concentration camps used for Japanese-Americans in World War II would be refurbished, and that civil rights and civil liberties might be suspended in the name of national security.

As a result, there emerged within the movement at least three new directions that represented not only new analytical postures but were also evidence of a growing pluralism. The overriding goals of liberation,

under the present system and that the only way the system can be changed is to reorient the people toward an entirely new system. The Weathermen and other individuals, who, it is assumed, are responsible for some of the bombings during the last year represent this state of mind.

Reform Institutions--The second state of mind views the resolution of social ills as being initiated by the reformation of institutions. These actors conclude that the self-constructed American model is valid, but that the relevant institutions are based on materialistic, economic, and elitist values and therefore no longer serve the public interest. As now constituted, the major institutions--political, economic, educational, military, social--are viewed as incapable of resolving social problems, and therefore must be transformed to meet the changing conditions and changing constituencies. This view relies mainly on a political analysis that views the materialistic-elitist values of those currently in power as the root cause of social problems.

Dropout in Protest--The third state of mind believes that there is no resolution to social ills and therefore the actors drop out in protest. The basic premise of this state is that existing institutions and their bureaucracies and the values of science and technology are not only too powerful to fight, but are by nature indifferent to the needs of people and therefore the society is irresistably headed for destruction. Thus, the only perceived recourse is to turn inward and thereby refuse to participate in any aspect of society. The emphasis in this state is on consciousness expansion, communal living, interest in Eastern philosophical religions and meditation practices, psychedelic light shows, rock music and lyrics, drugs, and sexual freedom.

People in either state of mind--to reform institutions or to drop out in protest--may move from there in either or both of two directions: to infuse the system and to change people.

Infuse the System--The basic premise of infusing the system is that the system can be altered radically from within. Therefore people must comply with the basic requirements for participation (dress, hair, language) and use their skills and consciousness to bring about fundamental change.

Change People--The basic premise of person-changing is that social change will occur when people become aware of the nature of their personal problems and society's problems. To this end, these actors have developed and use a "person-changing technology." Emphasis is on a dual awareness: (1) of the higher-consciousness nature of man and of the bankruptcy of the scientific-technocratic and behaviorist views of man, and (2) of institutionalized inequity and inhumanity in the social system. Based on their experience in the counterculture, these actors have concluded that the real revolution is not in the ghetto or the campus, but "in people's heads." Without a change in people's values and attitudes, institutional reform and nonparticipation are dead-end states.

Here they find common cause with the "human potential movement "which, from its Big Sur beginnings, has grown to include more than one hundred "growth centers" and free-university programs; and thousands of psychotherapists, sensitivity training and psycho-drama group leaders, sensory awareness teachers, yoga teachers, and assorted gurus.

Preserve the Social Order--To counter some of these developments, there has been a growing concern among some of the citizenry to preserve the social order. It is felt that the results of the loss of faith

constitute a serious social problem and therefore require some sort of counter-response from established authority. College administrators are required to "crack down" on demonstrators, "law and order" becomes a major political issue, tighter controls and increased restrictions on the use of marijuana and the psychedelic substances are instituted, and research on the psychedelic substances is limited severely.

Repress Subversives--These activities designed to preserve the social order have led to the articulation of the desire for repression of subversives. The actors in this state of mind view all attempts at social change as revolutionary, subversive, and un-American. Their attempts to preserve the social order have not been sufficient and therefore more serious measures are required.

Few of the actors in any of the states of mind described above would disagree that America is fragmented, polarized, and seemingly at war internally as well as externally as it moves into the 1970s. From a radical perspective, this condition has evolved over at least the last two decades largely as a consequence of changing conditions, changing constituencies, changing needs, and the apparent failure of American values and beliefs and American institutions to adapt coherently to the altered circumstances.

## Comparisons with Earlier Periods and Implications

Contemporary radicalism clearly possesses an historical continuity with earlier periods both in perspectives and operative modes. Yet it further represents something new and different in American history and Western culture. Some of the signs of this difference are:

- A new set of actors
- A new comprehensive view of issues and their relationships
- A new set of societal changes deemed essential
- A new set of techniques for bringing change about.

The new set of actors include not only the remaining economically disadvantaged but also affluent youth and college students, racial minorities, homosexuals, women, teachers, consumers, drug users, ecology activists, and experimenters with marriage substitutes. Although lacking in identical aims, they often find enough common cause to collaborate.

In particular, the actors share a new and comprehensive view of issues and their relationships; they view all problems as systemic in nature and therefore essentially interrelated. The problems are seen as flowing from central thrusts of Western culture. Therefore, the actors have concluded that a new set of social transformations is necessary. These transformations include far more than structural change, in that they require a re-examination of basic premises and assertions about the nature of man and society. This re-examination is not intended to destroy the Western political and intellectual traditions but rather attempts to analyze its origins in detail, demonstrate the dysfunctional nature of its present operative premises, and extend and expand existing concepts and methods of organizing reality.

For this re-examination, the new actors have developed and extended a new set of techniques, designed to expand the perceptions and consciousness of the society's members in two directions: (1) to perceive institutionalized hypocrisy, inequity, and inhumanity in the social system; and (2) to perceive the higher nature of man, and hence the demeaning quality of the prevailing behavioral-science and economic images of man that are supportive of the present system.

In the 1960s, these perceptions led to mergers of the radical and the "person-changing" or "new consciousness" perspectives and operative modes. Radical confrontations with established authority were viewed as instructive encounters and experimental learning s' uations. They were intended to enlighten the participants and observers about the assumed

oppressive, intransigent, and defensive nature of social institutions and customs. Meditation, yoga, and psychedelic substances were viewed as enlightening the participants to the spiritual dimensions of self and hence to the diminished image of man that makes the encapsulated nature of everyday life tolerable.

The merging of the radical and the "new consciousness" perspectives, operative modes, and techniques occurred for primarily two reasons. First, radicalism in America in the 1960s was stimulated by a far more subtle and pervasive set of problems than previously. The problems involved the bases of American civilization, its values and beliefs. Radical concern was no longer limited to single, often economic issues, and radicalism therefore required the broader language and scope and the concentration on values and awareness that the "new consciousness" provided. Second, a set of psychological techniques developed since World War II for altering perceptions and consciousness had made the "new consciousness" perspective more operative and relevant to intentional social and cultural change, and therefore to radicalism.

The many differences between past and present issues and modes of radical activity suggest that the unrest and disruption of the last 15 years may signify the necessity of more fundamental cultural changes rather than another set of reforms if American society is to survive. The repeated failure of proposals for limited reform has led to a loss of a sense of national purpose and desire to meet and solve the problems confronting the nation, and a growing despair (not confined to disenfranchised groups) that nothing can be done to restore vitality and confidence in the future. To begin to determine the likelihood that basic cultural change is necessary, and the nature and direction that such change might take, it is necessary to have a theoretical framework

relating societal viability, the nature of social dysfunctions, and the symptoms that dysfunctions generate. One such framework that has proved fruitful in conceptualizing and organizing a wide variety of symptomatic data is presented in the next section.

Section II

# THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

by

Norman B. McEachron

## II THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Because beliefs, values, and perceptions have been central to the emergence of contemporary radicalism and social dissension, any framework that purports to give insight into these phenomena must give social patterns of meaning and value a primary role. The essential notion of the scheme presented here is that a society is viable when its patterns of meaning and value (including beliefs about techniques to attain valued ends), its institutions and social processes, and the realities with which it must deal in order to continue to exist are congruent and mutually reinforce one another. To give this idea depth, it is necessary to describe in greater detail each of these elements, the interactions among them, and the causes and consequences of a loss of congruence.

### Environment, Institutions, and Values

#### Environment

In the sense used in this paper, the environmental realities or circumstances of environmental adaptation with which any viable society must deal, include the following:

(1) The personality systems of its members, particularly their physiological and psychological needs. According to several psychological theories, these needs and their associated life styles typically are arranged in a hierarchical ordering. Maslow (Ref. 10, Chap. 5, 6, 7), for example, posits the following hierarchy, starting with the lowest level of need:

- Physiological
- Safety - security
- Belongingness

- Self-Esteem
- Self-actualization, growth.

An important implication of such orderings is that needs corresponding to the next higher level of the hierarchy will tend to become dominant in the individual personality once the needs on lower levels have been satisfied and residual needs continue to be met. For most individuals, the pattern of need satisfaction and deprivation is determined during childhood and tends to be retained in the need hierarchy throughout adult life. Inglehart provides empirical data for this hypothesis and explores the implications for social change (Ref. 11).

(2) The ecological system within which the society functions, including both the biosphere of animal and plant life and the geosphere of inanimate resources such as air, water and minerals.

(3) The intersocietal system, or system of societies and cultures in interaction, of which the given society is a part. Modern transportation and communication have so extended man's awareness and exchange that this system is increasingly of planetary scope for most societies.

Institutions

The patterns of social structure and process of a society, reflected in its institutions, result from the necessity to divide the labor of its members in a stable fashion so as to assure the survival of the society. Parsons (Ref. 12) has suggested four sets of functional needs that must be met by any social system:

(1) Adaptation--adjustment to environmental realities, particularly through distribution and assignment of men and material to social tasks.

(2) Goal attainment--determination of the general will, balancing of goal priorities and appropriate policies, and the mobilization and allocation of resources as required by these policies.

(3) Integration and social control--the focusing of relationships within the social system so as to achieve solidarity, cohesion, stability, order, and continuation; positively, through

assertion and demonstration of basic values; negatively, through control of deviancy, regulation of conflict, adjudication of disputes.

(4) Latency--pattern maintenance: maintenance of basic cultural value patterns, socialization, maintenance of individual motivations consonant with these value patterns; and tension management: management and relief of personal tensions, reconciliation, healing.*

The division of labor, or what Lockwood calls the "factual disposition and organization of socially effective means" (Ref. 13, p. 139), that results from societal organization to meet these prerequisites will be an important feature of the social system in later discussion.

## Values and Beliefs

The common usage of the terms "values" and "beliefs" suggests that they constitute symbolic explanations and interpretations of reality and the human condition, thereby orienting perception and guiding human action related to social processes and environmental realities. More particularly, in any given situation, one's values and beliefs become sources of felt meaning and standards of appropriate behavior that are expected to lead eventually to desired outcomes. Values and beliefs thus form gestalt views or definitions of self, others, and the world which, to the extent that they are complementary among the members of a society, lay a foundation of shared expectations and mutual trust. On this basis, ground rules governing behavior (social norms) develop and become widely accepted, and

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* Latency functions are carried out primarily by the value-conserving socialization and healing processes of family, educational, religious, and healing institutions. In a period of value disorientation and cultural distortion, these institutions will be subject to considerable stress and may be supplemented or partially displaced by other institutions or noninstitutional alternatives.

division of labor in the society is defined and explained so as to make the resulting social structure morally acceptable. Without the shared expectations and mutual trust engendered by an effective value system, the integration of a society comes to depend on coercion and appeals to higher authority (Ref. 14, pp. 21, 28).

Synchronization

A viable noncoercive society is one that depends for its integration on the consistency, congruence and mutual reinforcement of the three elements--values, institutions, and environment; thus, the normal functioning of social institutions produces consistent results that members of the society can anticipate successfully and value positively on the basis of their previous experience and socialization. In turn, these results both meet the accepted needs of personality and physiology and are consonant and appropriate to the limits of the natural ecology and intersocietal relations. This completes the circle and validates the institutions and values.

Note that members of society in this conception do not have identical internal beliefs and values. Instead, what is necessary is that individuals and groups have complementary behavioral expectancies of each other, of social processes, and of the environment, so that the results of human actions are meaningful and predictable. These meanings are supplied by corresponding complexes of perceptions and values, and they justify the behavioral expectations and thus the social structure and relations to self, nature, and other societies that are experienced. Such patterns of meaning, though widely diverse in a complex society like the United States, ultimately meet in a "dominant implicit paradigm" that contains the major assumptions about the existential nature of the world, a systematized version of this that is appealed to as criteria of rationality

(and to which science contributes), and the system of symbols used by the population of the society (Ref. 15, pp. 141-49). It is this dominant set of cognitive and affective orientations of the members that must be "synchronized" with the institutions and environment of a society if it is to be in a dynamic homeostasis, able to function (without primary reliance on coercion) as an adaptive system toward internally and externally generated forces for change. The adaptation then occurs through incremental changes in social structure and paradigm.

Several specific roles that a synchronized value-belief system or paradigm plays can be illustrated by example. In terms of the social system itself, values and beliefs legitimize its structure and status ordering. Each social role or task in the society's division of labor has associated with it certain rights and obligations vis-à-vis other roles, and a certain amount of prestige in the rank-ordering or hierarchy of roles. In general, the basis of this hierarchy is a value-derived determination of the significance of each role. One of the most important determinants of status is the amount of supervisory power and authority to enforce decisions that are associated with the performance of the role.*

All functioning societies generate a hierarchy as a concomitant to solving their problems of role allocation, role assignment, conflict resolution, and collective action. "This social stratification is stabilized through the envalued explanation of each status's postion and through such homeostatic processes as social mobility" (Ref. 14, p. 80). When a society is in dynamic equilibrium, these envalued explanations are accepted by both of those of high status and those of low status by virtue

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* Wealth is another significant determinant, although in many societies it is a reward for successful application of supervisory power (achievement-oriented societies) or a symbol of the role (ascriptive societies), or some mixture of both.

of their shared values and common perceptions. For instance, we may cite the cases of stratification by income and race. As part of their frontier heritage of laissez-faire individualism, Americans have long held that "any individual worth his salt can get ahead and raise himself out of poverty." By this reasoning, anyone who is poor must be otherwise inadequate--"lazy," "stupid," "no good"--and therefore, deserves to be poor and to be assigned the most menial and disagreeable tasks in the division of labor. As long as this is accepted by the poor themselves their frustrations will be turned inward on themselves rather than outward on society, as is suggested by records of psychopathology among the lower income groups (Ref. 16).

The stability of the American "Horatio Alger" belief is reinforced by the fact that many (white) ethnic groups did succeed in working their way out of low status positions. Familiar examples include the Irish-Americans and, more recently, several eastern and southern European groups such as the Italian-Americans. Their progress is an example of the way homeostatic processes of social mobility stabilize the values-beliefs and the social structure of society. For several nonwhite groups, however, such social mobility has not been available. Thus, in the particular case of blacks in American society, a different homeostatic process was operative. For nearly a century after the Civil War, a social situation of continued low status and lack of social mobility for the great majority of blacks was stabilized through the acceptance by both whites and blacks of a firm, envalued definition of the Negro race as innately inferior, such that few Negroes could be expected to succeed to the level of whites. In turn, the failure of blacks to do so (e.g., on intelligence tests) was taken to confirm this innate inferiority.

> Because Negroes accepted the value structure's explanation of their status, the main body of the Negro population did not support innovations developed by marginal men from their own group, and the resulting relative stability of the system reinforced the stereotypes held by whites, including both those whites who exploited the Negroes and those whose roles did not directly involve Negro labor (Ref. 14, p. 71).

In terms of the personality of societal members, the value-belief system sets limits on the acceptable range of personal behavior and determines what personal needs the well-socialized members of the society will regard as valid. Early in this century, Freud pointed out that the values and beliefs of late nineteenth century Europe led to considerable repression of certain affective needs, and thence to different forms of mental disturbance for some individuals. Even so, these values and beliefs continued to be accepted as appropriate and meaningful well into the twentieth century, as evidenced by the continued labeling of those who did not abide by them (and the corresponding social norms) as either mentally ill or criminals (e.g., consenting adults engaging in homosexual acts).

With regard to the ecological system, the values and beliefs of a society define its relationships with nature and natural resources. Values and beliefs in the culture provide symbolic (often mythical) explanations of man's place in the natural order and given meaning to his responses to ecological forces. Thus, particular societal and individual situations are defined in relation to these forces, and standards for appropriate behavior develop. Lynn White (Ref, 17, pp. 75-94) has suggested that by destroying pagan animism (with its guardian spirits of every tree, every hill, every brook, and with man a part of nature) and replacing it with a dualism of man and nature--and by proclaiming that "God planned all of (creation) explicitly for man's benefit and rule: no item in the physical creation had any purpose except to serve man's

purposes" and "it is God's will that man exploit nature for man's proper ends"--Judeo-Christian premises made possible the emergence of exploitive technology and natural science. " . . . Viewed historically, modern science is an extrapolation of natural theology and . . . modern technology is at least partly to be explained as an Occidental, voluntarist realization of the Christian dogma of man's transcendence of, and rightful mastery over, nature" (Ref. 17, pp. 85-86).

Finally, similar considerations apply to the intersocietal system. Such phrases from the past as "bearing the white man's burden" or "making the world safe for democracy" (or, from Communism) suggest the images (values-beliefs) with which different Western nations have conceived their role in the world. One of the most pervasive doctrines affecting the intersocietal system is nationalism. The values and beliefs inherent in the nation-state form of regime are those that affirm societal uniqueness, separateness and (most strongly) independence, self-sufficiency, and freedom of action vis-à-vis other states. As a set of political values, nationalism defines and justifies particular aspects and limits on the relationships of the society to others, with consequent strictures on its domestic political and economic subsystems. Nationalism has come to be a fundamental organizational principle of virtually all the world's major societies and has helped to generate demands for nationhood among many subcultural groupings in existing states.

The issues raised by contemporary radicals relate to all these aspects of societal environment and social structure, and include the following:

(1) The society is not meeting the physiological and psychological needs of its members, as is evidenced by the existence of extensive poverty, threats to minority group rights, lack of opportunities for meaningful participation, and threats to individual rights and freedoms.

(2) The division of labor is faulty and socialization is malfunctional; labor distribution is unequal, unjust, and dehumumanizing; consensus is lacking on goal priorities; and inequities and injustices are perpetuated through institutional roles and procedures.

(3) The ecological system is damaged by the fouling of the air, water, and soil, the irresponsible perpetration of ecological imbalances, and the depletion of limited resources.

(4) The intersocietal system is characterized by persistent war, threat of nuclear holocaust, world population and food shortage pressures, increasing have-have not gap, and world poverty pressures.

Considered in isolation from each other, few of these problems appear entirely unknown in the annals of man. For example, unrest and revolt about perceived social injustice and societal dysfunctions have been a recurrent theme of social change in world and national history. What is significant and perhaps unprecedented about these problems today is that so many of them are considered likely to become critical in the next two decades (Ref. 18), and, in terms of present perceptions, they appear to be an extremely complex and interrelated network of destabilizing social forces. This mutual interaction exacerbates each of the individual problems to make them appear systemic, and thus much less amenable to conventional processes of social reform.

In consequence, the present situation in the developed world, particularly the United States, appears to differ in important ways from many previous periods of strain and unrest, in which the primary source of disaffection seems to have been the ineptitude or intransigence of a governing elite faced with demands for reform of a few societal subsystems. Another significant difference, which has been suggested by writers as diverse in outlook as the "Establishment" (Ref. 19) and the "counterculture" (Ref. 20, pp. 149-62) is that the composite of multiple difficulties and destabilizing forces we face may be essentially irresolvable

within the frameworks of prevailing meanings and perceptions, because these frameworks may themselves be root causes of many problems and may prevent us from seeing others more clearly and simply. These writers suggest that prevailing patterns of meaning and value--and the institutional forms that have developed in consonance with them--served well enough in the development of modern technology (physical, biological, and behavioral) and economy (national and international), but are proving basically incapable of regulating their uses, controlling the many problems that arise from them, and ensuring the just distribution of their benefits. This situation has developed, it is argued, simply because these meanings, perceptions, and institutions arose in an era when men did not have the responsibility they now have for the future evolution of the planet, and when they did not face the increasing instability of a world of their own creation which they must be willing and able to sustain if they are to survive.

If the above views are correct, then to understand the sources of contemporary tensions we must shift our attention from evident problems to their underlying roots--the growing inadequacy of existing values, perceptions, and institutions to manage and resolve problems that they have in part helped to create.

## Societal Self-Regulation and Forms of Change

A healthy society is one that is able to maintain, develop, and extend its capacity to satisfy the survival and growth needs of its members. To possess this potential, its normal social processes must "control and counteract variations which would destroy the society if they exceeded more than a limited range" (Ref. 21, p. 62). In biology, this is called "homeostatic equilibrium." A society possesses such a capacity for self-regulation if and only if its dominant paradigm institutional structure and process, and environmental elements are sufficiently congruent, self-consistent, and mutually reinforcing that the resulting societal actions sustain the existence of the society and the mutual benefit of its members. Such a society will be termed "congruent," "synchronized," or--in the sense of systemic self-regulation--"in equilibrium."* (See Figure 2.)

Change can occur without disrupting the self-regulating capabilities of a society if its values, social structure, and environment change congruently. Such synchronized change is gradual and incremental, but over time it may result in basic alterations in each of these three elements never intended by the actors. Typically, these actors are concerned

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* It is clear, of course, that full congruence represents an "ideal state" of societies, one never fully reached by an actual society. Each actual society will have its range of "tolerance of incongruity," outside of which decided differences would be expected in societal dynamics. Hall (Ref. 22) points out that all cultures have at least some incompatabilities between values and behavioral norms, or among values, that are suppressed actively below the level of awareness in order to prevent dissonance. In line with such a psychological analogy, these incompatabilities would be expected to emerge in symptoms of cultural pathology when they become sufficiently great (i.e., exceed the tolerance range for that society and the members of that society). These symptoms are investigated in detail later in this paper.




**MEANING**

a. Values
b. Beliefs
c. Perceptions
d. Symbols

**SOCIAL ACTION**

a. Pattern Maintenance/Tension Management
b. Integration and Social Control
c. Goal Attainment
d. Adaptation

**ENVIRONMENT**

a. Personality (Somatic and Psycho-social)
b. Ecological
c. Intersocietal

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FIGURE 2 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

merely with small reforms, such as might arise from resolving a dispute, rewarding an innovative performance of a familiar role, or removing an inconsistency in a norm (Ref. 14, p. 57). For example, a mediator may award new working conditions in a labor dispute, an educator may be promoted for innovations in the classroom, or the Supreme Court may resolve a conflict between constitutional provisions and local law and custom.*

A different situation develops when the actors perceive that some type of pressure, arising from internal processes or from external threat or influence, is destroying the system's regulative capability and that basic change is necessary for the the society to survive. Policies intended to achieve basic value or structural change are needed precisely because some sudden, unfamiliar, or unheeded situation has exceeded the capabilities of normal regulative practices. It is only in these kinds of situations that the threat of revolution exists (Ref. 14, p. 71).

The term "revolution" in this paper denotes a special form of attempted social change that may or may not succeed. Specifically, a revolution is the endeavor, by the use of coercion or violence, to achieve a sudden, sweeping, fundamental change "in political organization, social structure, economic property control, and the predominant myth of social order, thus indicating a major break in the continuity of development" (Ref. 25, pp. 333-34). Examples are the French and Russian revolutions.

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* Tiryakian (Ref. 23, p.91) suggests in counterpoint to this theme that "modern" societies (which usually possess a value commitment to change) may have a rather high endemic degree of disequilibrium, or "index of revolutionary potential . . . (Rp) . . . which is necessary if the capacity to maintain modernization is to be retained . . . . A certain Rp, then, is reflective of a certain state of tension in the society which has both functional and dysfunctional aspects." For a more pessimistic view of change (and increasing rates of change) in modern societies and its inherent disorienting and destabilizing aspects, see Toffler (Ref. 24).

"Coercion" in this context is a hierarchy of means, of which the use of physical force is only the final and extreme form. Specifically, coercion includes deterrence by warning (of the general capacity and readiness to act against those who are not compliant, as in terrorism) or threat (of specific negative sanctions if certain desires or suggestions are not complied with); the prevention of actions through physical confinement (imprisonment); other forms of punishment (such as fining); and, finally, the direct use of physical force itself (Ref. 26, p. 31). "Violence," as a means of coercion, is "systemic violence," by which we mean acts of disruption, destruction, and injury whose purpose, choice of targets or victims, surrounding circumstances, implementation, and effects have societal significance, i.e., tend to modify the behavior of others in situations of social interaction that have consequences for the social system (Ref. 27, p. 13). Revolution, then, is the adoption of coercive means (typically involving violence) to cause the social system to change, and it is resorted to only when means short of violent coercion are perceived by revolutionaries to have failed or been blocked.

Successful policies to achieve resynchronization in a period of disequilibrium lead to a form of social change that will be called "developmental change" and is distinguishable from both homeostatic change and revolutionary change. Somewhat like revolutionary change and unlike systemically regulated change, developmental change is characterized by substantial amounts of purposive or planned change of societal values, structures, and environment; it is more gradual than revolutionary change, and it is neither a violent transfer of political power nor a violent reorganization of social and economic life such as occurred in the French and Russian revolutions.

Synchronization and Political Stability

In modern societies the political subsystem forms the central set of institutions charged with societal integration (including the regulation of conflict) and the attainment of collective goals (including homeostatic change). Thus the political institutions are the principal target of revolutionary activity generated by dissynchronization. Under conditions of congruence, on the other hand, the political subsystem--and social structures and processes generally--are perceived to be consonant with or facilitative of the basic values of the population. More precisely, they are objects of trust and identification, which means they are believed to deliver in the majority of cases valued outcomes (conditions requisite for enjoying or holding the values) without the members of society having to expend resources specifically to influence them toward those outcomes (Ref. 28, p. 54). This sense of trust is a kind of "diffuse support" which "forms a reservoir of favorable attitudes or good will that helps members to accept or tolerate system outputs to which they are opposed or the effect of which they see as damaging to their wants." (Ref. 29, p. 273). For those relatively few situations where influence is felt to be needed, confident system members will perceive persuasion or the activation of value-commitments (e.g., appeal to conscience) to be more effective in influencing decisions than the higher cost methods of inducement (bargaining) or constraint. (Ref. 30). Similarly, authorities in the system--officeholders whose decisions are binding on those affected, in that they will be backed up by legitimate force where necessary--will tend to use persuasion or activation of commitments, rather than sanctions or coercion, to maintain social integration and contain attempts to influence their decisions (Ref. 28). A period of high trust is an "Era of Good Feeling" between institutions and their constituents.

Nevertheless, any realistic society always has conflicts of interest within the dominant value set, conflicts that the political subsystem in

particular is charged with managing and if possible resolving to maintain system integration. Optimal trust conditions in connection with conflicts of interest (and hence questions of system equity or bias) take a different form than in connection with the attainment of collective goals (and hence questions of overall systemic effectiveness or efficiency). For the former, high confidence of favorable outcomes on the part of some groups is less likely to be a stable support for the system than is a general perception of nonbias--a neutral trust orientation--since if one or more groups feel particularly advantaged by the system, others are likely to feel disadvantaged and will then tend to withdraw their support. However, this is not the case with respect to the efficiency of the system--the existence of high confidence for any one segment of the population need not imply less confidence for any other. Thus

> . . . the ideal trust orientation for any group is neutrality on questions of bias and confidence on questions of efficiency. This leaves its resultant trust somewhere in between at a position of moderate confidence. (Ref. 28, pp. 57-58)

If on the other hand there is conflict with the basic values seemingly embodied in or represented by the system as a whole or one of its elements, the maintenance of a positive orientation or identification with the political subsystem becomes highly dependent on a perception of the ability--by oneself or a reference group in the system--to achieve sufficient reform of the system to relieve the value conflict. We term this perception one of efficacy. Since such basic value conflicts are likely to arise much more frequently during periods of dissynchronization, questions of efficacy assume particular salience at these times. The simultaneous perception both of a basic and, therefore, threatening value conflict developing from dissynchronization and of inefficacy in system reform leads to a condition of estrangement from the system called alienation (Ref. 31). Widespread alienation, in turn, is a precursor of revolution.

The trust and self-identification with a political system generated by value sharing and by the consistent effective performance of the system are the source of its power--its generalized capacity to generate and mobilize resources to attain collective goals by securing the performance of binding obligations on individuals and institutions (Ref. 32). Power in this sense is needed by a political system because in order to be effective, it must be able to take actions and support them with resources so as to meet exigencies, and fulfill those collective goals that cannot be predicted in advance (e.g., a nation's defense budget is strongly affected by the sometimes unknowable and changing policies of its adversaries). Thus the nature and extent of future demands upon system members for loyal cooperation in the supply of resources also cannot be predicted. Effectiveness therefore depends on the "loan" to the system by its members of the right to specify future binding obligations upon them--i.e., a loan of power to the system--without circumscribing the use of that loan (Ref. 32, pp. 383-395).

The importance to a system of the trust and identification of its members is now further apparent: members will loan power to it--by granting it support and loyal cooperation--only if they identify with its values and believe that it will act effectively in their long-run interest, regardless of short term disadvantages. Using this "borrowed" power as input, the system generates outcomes that either satisfy or dissatisfy system members and thus generates conditions for the growth or decline of its power.

If the system regularly and efficiently fulfills members' expectations, they will trust and identify closely with it. On this basis its leaders are able to make new commitments in the name of a larger collective interest--commitments that have not necessarily been specifically demanded or authorized by any supporting constituencies--and to successfully invoke the performance of <u>new</u> binding obligations in fulfillment

of these new commitments. This is a normal homeostatic process of leadership which yields a net increase in the power of the system through "borrowing" power form its members. (Ref. 33) If this extension of "power credit' to the system is prudently "invested" in increasing the system's "productivity"--its capacity to fulfill its commitments--then the investment will eventually be more than repaid to the members (i.e., "repaid with interest") in terms of satisfying outputs which in turn sustain the members' confidence in the system (its "credit rating").

Thus synchronized conditions provide the basis and opportunity for overall growth of a system's capacity to achieve collective improvements. Correspondingly, however, the development of dissynchronization will lead to a loss of trust--because system outputs no longer meet member wants and because the efficacy of the system itself declines--resulting in a tendency toward contraction of the system's power credit rating. The process of contraction, which Parsons calls "power deflation" (Ref. 26), parallels the development of political alienation as a macro-level systemic precursor of revolution.

The invocation of binding obligations by system authorities does not always meet with a positive response. In such cases, to make authority effective requires resort to increasingly direct forms of coercion, ending in the use of force. The socially organized use of force is essentially a monopoly of the constitutionally paramount organs of government (Ref. 26, pp. 57-8). Thus particularly during a period of power deflation a government may use the force of police or the army. These actions will have the loyal support and cooperation of the majority of the society's members as being necessary for the maintenance of social order and integration if they perceive this exercise of authority to be legitimate.

Legitimation of a political system /

> involves essentially a question of the standing of authority . . . in terms of the institutionalized values of the society. It is concerned with "rights" to exercise authority at the level of both "constitutionality" and moral right. . . . It is the highest normative defense against the breakdown of a system of societal order within which power can operate as a medium. (Ref. 26 , p. 57)

Thus legitimation is closely tied to synchronization between value-belief structures and the social system, especially its political subsystem. Under conditions of synchronization the legitimation of the subsystems is secured, but this security is jeopardized by severe and widespread dissynchronization, which indeed may result in their legitimacy being called into question. If the legitimacy of the established authority structure were to be lost, the invocation of binding obligations would be futile and the basis of authority would become solely its control of superior force. If in turn the loss of authority were to prove irretrievable, any event that appears to shake that control would be enough to launch a revolution.

Destabilizing Change

"Revolution can be rationally contemplated only in a society that is undergoing radical . . . change and that is in need of still further change" (Ref. 14, p. 60). Radical change results in the dissynchronization of values, social structure, and environment which is the first prerequisite of revolution. This is not to say that change is inherently destabilizing, but rather that rapid change usually operates differentially on the three societal elements, particularly as between values and social structure, or by producing conflicts and inconsistencies within a value system or social structure. Change that does not induce inconsistencies beyond the tension-management and self-regulation capabilities of a society, whether it is regressive or progressive, will not introduce a

threat of revolution. A sudden, sharp, regressive change can, however, result in such a threat by producing an incongruence between expectations (the value-belief structure) and fulfillment (by social processes) which in turn results in frustration and then aggressive responses (Ref. 34, pp. 5-6).

More generally, changes in whole societies can be described in terms of their sources--whether within (endogenous) or without (exogenous) the society--and the focus of their initial impact: the elements of values/beliefs, structures and processes, and environment on which these changes have their first effect. This scheme is discussed in detail with examples and applications to contemporary America in Volume II.

The most pervasive sources of change in developing and modern societies are technological and scientific developments that simultaneously alter man's view of himself in the world (beliefs and perceptions, thence values and expectations) and his modes of relation and adaptation to his natural and social surroundings. In a developing nation, communications and transportation not only tie the country more closely together as a unit, but they also bring the vision of economic well being and different social statuses into the awareness of its peasants and backward tribes. Descriptions of the "post-industrial society" for advanced nations highlight the domination of expanding technology in their societal change (Ref. 35).

On a regional or societal level, technology and science may lead to such rapid changes in both knowledge and social organization that they directly affect the capability of latency processes to adaptively sustain the coherence and effectiveness of patterns of meaning and situational definitions in a society. For modernizing societies, these disorganizing effects typically occur with significant increases in the rate of urbanization, owing to the disabling effects of rapid increases in demographic

concentration on existing types of social organization and process and social expectations (Ref. 23, p. 92). More generally, with the increased pace of change in both modernizing and fully modern societies, an increasing strain is placed on an individual's orienting pattern of beliefs and values by the situations of novelty, complexity, ambiguity and change. These situations may be severely disorienting to the individual if they occur in sufficient number and there is inadequate recognition of, enculturation in, or attention to aspects of existing culture that continue to be realistic and effective guides to perception and behavior. The inability to recognize or attend to these still viable aspects, in turn, can develop naturally when changes in life patterns and social interaction appear to render inapplicable or contradict one's basic beliefs, habits and overall image of the world. In many areas of his life, the individual is faced with increasing rates of sensory stimulation, information input, and demands for rapid, complex, nonroutine decisions and interactions with other persons and groups that are "unprogrammed" by his existing value-belief patterns. In his decisions and interactions, the individual lacks the stable expectations with regard to outcomes which is the basis of his trust in self and others. When in turn stable guideposts are lacking in many focal areas--because of the pervasiveness of change--these demands may be felt as overwhelming, generalizing into a pervasive sense of "cultural loss" and personal isolation. Such intrapersonal and interpersonal effects of rapid change appear to be increasing (Ref. 24, Chap. 16).

On a systemic level, the "world macroproblem" that has resulted from the consequences of technological development and application appears to constitute a set of pressures on national and world societal systems that is so intense and unprecedented as to seriously impair the established processes for individual tension-management and structural adaptation. This has been a result of the multiplicity and interconnectedness of

these pressures, which have acted to induce a condition of "multiple dysfunction" in societal systems, i.e., a condition in which several component subsystems do not function in ways that are necessary to maintain self-regulation and adaptation (Ref. 35, pp. 5-11).

Simple dysfunctions, in contrast, involve no more than a subset of insitituional forms in the society, while the remaining institutional forms, environmental realities, and core beliefs and values remain synchronized, thereby providing individuals with reliable guide-posts to behavior in many focal areas of interaction. In this case, the crisis is structural and can be isolated from the rest of the system that continues to be functional, though perhaps with impaired effectiveness. Resources from these other functional subsystems can be mobilized to affect needed changes.* The history of the depression of the 1930s, illustrates this process pursued successfully, including the need for strong and able leadership.

Today, because many national and world subsystems have been impaired or rendered dysfunctional by emerging problems, it appears quite difficult with conventional approaches and perceptions to isolate these subsystems one from another and effect repairs incrementally. The identification of the exact nature of the dysfunctions is a difficult task, which is compounded by the probability that the pattern of multiple dysfunction extends up to and includes the basic gestalts of meaning and value in these systems rendering them untrustworthy as bases of interpretation and action. Indeed, since these basic gestalts guide the leaders' perceptions and interpretations of experience also, the

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* This does not guarantee that the leaders of the society can or will carry out policies that achieve such change. If they do not, simple dysfunctions can spread and lead to revolution or social disintegration (Ref. 36, p. 9).

leadership of these systems can have literally in front of them all the data they need about societal crises they face and still not "see" the dysfunctions clearly enough to determine what must be done to restore societal viability.

Such a crisis is cultural, not simply structural, since it concerns basic incongruities between central elements of the dominant implicit belief and value system, and structural and environmental realities. Obviously, it is more severe than a structural crisis as we have defined the latter, and its resolution will induce more profound changes in the society affected. Tiryakian's description of what he called "societal" change characterizes a revolutionary or developmental resynchronization of a severe cultural crisis

> . . . a change in the organizational structure of a total society . . . radical in the sense of being a total transformation of institutional structures . . . "a recasting of the social order" . . . fundamentally a qualitative change, a discontinuity or "leap" in the general normative pattern of the organization, which will be manifested in all major foci of institutional structure . . . a "religious" transformation . . . a very fundamental and dramatic form of religious experience, essentially one of death and rebirth . . . intense social "purification" and "renewal" . . . perhaps homologous, at the level of personality structure, [to] sudden transformations in the nature of "conversion" experiences. (Ref. 23, pp. 70, 72).

These descriptions are useful in that they emphasize the nonrational elements in any mobilization to achieve fundamental cultural renewal, whether revolutionary or developmental.

Successful policies to achieve cultural resynchronization short of revolution are more difficult to design and implement than policies for structural change. Not only are the nonrational elements important in the process, but also the society's leadership typically is unable, as we have suggested, to view the fundamental problems clearly through

the old value-belief system. In turn this situation substantially lowers the probability of developmental change in the society, because unrelieved dysfunctions gradually will spread to other, previously functional or mildly dysfunctional subsystems, thereby lowering the society's adaptive capability still further. In turn, "it is a people's awareness of the actual, or incipient, metastasis of social ills that causes the 'loss of confidence' or 'rupture of consensus' that so often presages revolutionary conditions" (Ref. 35, p.9)--or, we might add, totalitarian conditions. Recent events in the United States clearly have implied the development of such conditions. Indeed, as we shall see later, the detailed symptoms of a society entering a period of cultural dissynchronization and its associated multiple dysfunction bear a striking resemblance to phenomena and events of recent American history.

## Cultural Dissynchronization

One of the most famous descriptions of a culture undergoing a basic crisis of dissynchronization was penned at the beginning of the seventeenth century by the English poet John Donne:

> And new philosophy calls all in doubt,
> The element of fire is quite put out;
> The sun is lost, and th'earth, and no man's wit
> Can well direct him where to look for it.
> And freely men confess that this world's spent,
> When in the planets and the firmament
> They seek so many new; they see that this
> Is crumbled out again to his atomies.
> 'Tis all in pieces, all coherence gone.

It is significant that the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century in England was a period of pervasive, accelerating social, economic and cultural change not unlike our own, capped by the first radically modernizing revolution in Western civilization, the Puritan Revolution of 1640 (Ref. 37).

This pervasive sense of loss of cultural coherence characterizes what we have termed cultural dissynchronization as distinct from structural dissynchronization. The basic difference between these two forms of social crisis is that, for the latter, the basic or core elements of the society's dominant implicit patterns of meaning and value remain substantially congruent with members' life experiences and their interactions with most social institutions. Only a small subset of institutions and social processes are incongruent. However, in a cultural crisis the dissynchronization extends to embrace the basic organizing principles, values, and perceptions underpinning the social order.

Because a cultural crisis strikes so much more deeply, we expect that it should give rise to phenomena that are absent or much less evident for structural disequilibrium. In practice the distinction is more difficult to make, and many writers who describe their concerns as being with basic

"structural" change (Ref. 38, p. 79) or with "cultural" change (Ref. 15, pp. 188-206) portray the initial symptoms of destabilization in almost identical language.* Yet we shall press to distinguish the two forms of societal crisis -- perhaps as "ideal types" -- because the implications of the two for policy will differ in important respects, not the least in the locus of the most significant social change processes.

To be useful, the analytic distinction should provide us with a specification and understanding of social phenomena which are characteristic indicators of cultural disorientation that lie over and above those of structural dissynchronization. We can then compare these with contemporary events to get a sense of the plausibility of cultural crisis as an underlying phenomenon in America today. Of course, such a proposition cannot be proved but if it sheds light on these events, it deserves to be considered seriously. This is the subject of the next several pages, after which we consider the process of systemic (and particularly political) distrust and alienation and its consequences, which are in many ways similar to cultural disorientation but focus on disaffection and estrangement from specific institutions and processes of society, not necessarily its basic beliefs and values. Systemic alienation thus will characterize both structural and cultural crises, though it may be expected to be more pervasive and serious with the latter. It is systemic alienation focussed on the polity that is a necessary prerequisite and motivator for the radical reformism and revolutionary activity against governments that first prompted this investigation.

The single most characteristic factor that underlies a situation of cultural disequilibrium or incongruence is that, for increasing numbers

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* The great Western revolutions -- the British (1640), French, Russian -- have been cultural as well as structural crises.

of well socialized and partially socialized members, the society's dominant pattern of beliefs, values, perceptions, and symbols "no longer provide[s] an acceptable definition and explanation of existence" (Ref. 14 , pp. 72-3). This has individual (microsocial) and societal (macrosocial) consequences.

Microsocial Indications--One impact on the individual has been portrayed in graphic terms by literary and scientific writers concerned both with revolution and cultural disorganization in more primitive societies. Pettee's discription is classic:

> Given that cramp exists, that is, that institutions are out of adjustment to life in a given society, individual purposes feel maladjusted. The consciousness of maladjustment creates an internal tension which leads the maladjusted individual to ponder his situation. Given his imaginative and intellectual powers, this may result in anything from getting drunk to writing a book (Ref. 39 , p. 66).

Oppenheimer describes the sources of maladjustment in terms consonant with our use of "values and beliefs":

> The old answers of society no longer work, at least for some people; hence unpredictability results, and the individual is confronted with conflicting interpretations of events (Ref. 40 , p. 25).

Anthony Wallace describes the same situation:

> Under conditions of disorganization, the system, from the standpoint of at least some of its members, is unable to make possible the reliable satisfaction of certain values that are held to be essential to continued well-being and self-respect. The mazeway [the entire set of cognitive maps of positive and negative goals of self, others, and material objects and of their possible dynamic interrelations that an individual maintains at a given time] of a culturally disillusioned person, accordingly, is an image of a world that is unpredictable, or barren in its simplicity, or both, and is apt to contain severe identity conflicts. His mood (depending on the precise nature of

> the disorganization) will be one of panic-stricken anxiety, shame, guilt, depression or apathy (Ref. 15, p. 189).

Implicit in these descriptions is the fact that disorientation with respect to "the old answers of society," i.e., its dominant implicit paradigm, usually takes place initially below the level of explicit recognition by the individual. As Hall has pointed out, "...culture controls behavior in deep and persisting ways, many of which are outside of awareness and therefore beyond conscious control of the individual" (Ref. 22, p. 35). Therefore, a condition of dissynchronization of basic cultural beliefs and values brings about situations where events persistently do not follow their supposed antecedents but where the source of the difficulty is not clear to the person or persons concerned. Intense anxiety results, rather than fear or threat from specifiable objects, because the source of the disorientation cannot be located.

> The deprivation of data that confirm to the individual his psychological set, his "mazeway," arouses shattering anxiety and is followed by denial: the individual virtually blots out awareness of injury and loss...and this anxiety and denial response may continue for a considerable period of time (Ref.15, p. 203).

The denial response further inhibits the awareness of the source of the disorientation in value incongruence.

The capability of individuals to bear considerable psychological strain, through denial and other defense mechanisms, and still function effectively, means that "much of the behavioral change that we often expect to follow conditions of non-congruence may not occur" (Ref. 41, p. 105). Established personality patterns, allegiances to culture and society, and participation in social activities may continue for extended periods without evidence of cultural stress (reaction formation may increase allegiances to the established culture among some individuals). This will generate a condition of "pluralistic ignorance," in which each disoriented individual perceives others as oriented and only himself ill

at ease. It is only a short step to the presumption that his disorientation is his own individual problem, a result of personal maladjustments rather than societal ones. This assumption provides additional stabilization and a sense of false calm among many groups in a society experiencing slowly growing value incongruence, though the individuals in these groups may be experiencing intense feelings of normlessness, meaninglessness, or even "quiet desperation."

In a modern society undergoing value (cultural) dissynchronization with respect to institutions, or both institutions and environment, groups that are most likely to feel the full impact of disorientation are those that have simultaneously a high a priori sense of identification with the dominant cultural values as personal goals to strive for, and a low sense of personal security and assurance toward attaining them, i.e., the lower middle and working classes. Because of the threat from changing culturally defined rules, they are the most likely to employ psychological defense mechanisms such as denial or reaction formation to avoid the perception of cultural dysfunctionality, and to become angry at those in the society who may suggest it. Other groups -- more secure or less attached to the dominant value system -- will be likely to experience lesser anxiety and stress from disorientation per se.*

Depending on the salience and mode of impact of cultural dissynchronization on different individuals in a society, and on their different capacities to bear psychological stress, eventually the growing personal tensions of disorientation must be handled externally -- socially -- as well as internally. Normally, they are managed and relieved by family

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* Other individuals and groups, e.g., urban ghetto minorities, may experience more personal disorganization, but from stressful conditions generated directly by existing social processes, not from cultural disorientation.

and religious institutions, and peripherally by educational institutions. As personal disorganization intensifies and becomes more widespread, these institutions will be subjected to considerable strain. Progressive failures of these institutions to perform adequately their appropriate orienting and tension-managing functions will begin to occur with increasing disequilibrium, and these failures will lead with growing frequency to the breakdown and disbanding of particular institutional units (e.g., separation or divorce, declining membership in established churches) or the emergence of varigated alternative forms among different groups. Examples are the communes (surrogate families) appearing in contemporary America, free schools, new emotionally oriented churches, folk or mystical religions, and encounter groups. In turn, institutional failures and the struggles to create replacements increase the sense of strain and decrease the tension-managing capabilities of the society. As will be discussed later, in modern societies much of the demand for orientation and tension-management becomes transferred in these situations from traditional institutions to the polity.

Typical dysfunctional responses of members of a society being subjected to increasing cultural disorganization have been described by Anthony F. C. Wallace. The following passages (first written in 1956) portray the second and third temporarily overlapping, but functionally distinct stages of what he had termed "revitalization processes" (a particular form in which developmental or revolutionary sociocultural change might occur):

> II. <u>The Period of Increased Individual Stress</u>. The sociocultural system is being "pushed" progressively out of equilibrium by the forces described earlier: climatic and biotic change, epidemic disease, war and conquest, social subordination, acculturation, internally generated decay, and so forth. Increasingly large numbers of individuals are placed under what is to

them intolerable stress by the failure of the system to accommodate the satisfaction of their needs. Anomie and disillusionment become widespread, as the culture is perceived to be disorganized and inadequate; crime and illness increase sharply in frequency as individualistic asocial responses. But the situation is still generally defined as one of fluctuation within the steady state.

III. The Period of Cultural Distortion. Some members of the society attempt, piecemeal and ineffectively, to restore personal equilibrium by adopting socially disfunctional expedients. Alcoholism, venality in public officials, the "black market," breaches of sexual and kinship mores, hoarding, gambling for gain, "scapegoating," and similar behaviors that, in the preceding period, were still defined as individual deviancies, in effect become institionalized efforts to circumvent the evil effects of "the system." Interest groups, losing confidence in the advantages of maintaining mutually acceptable interrelationships, may resort to violence in order to coerce others into unilaterally advantageous behavior. Because of the malcoordination of cultural changes during this period, they are rarely able to reduce the impact of the forces that have pushed the society out of equilibrium, and in fact lead to a continuous decline in organization (Ref 42, pp. 191-192).

During these periods, individuals and groups that have lower involvement with and commitment to the existing culture, and yet possess high resources of energy and feel secure with themselves, are likely to attempt to develop alternative cultural forms, perhaps borrowed from other cultures or recalled from the society's past history, in attempts to reduce their anxiety and regain meaningful orientation to self, others, and the physical world. Those with less energy and sense of security or a higher need for outward conformity and attachment to the existing social order (ritualistic participation) are more likely to seek relief of tension through private or socially passive means, such as participation in fervent religious or nativistic organizations, which focus on meanings and orientations outside the present social order, either in a heavenly kingdom or in a glorious past or future. However, the distinction between

these two responses -- innovation and withdrawal -- may not be easy to make in practice. Is communal living today a cultural innovation to replace failing family patterns, or is it a form of withdrawal into a group setting for mutual support in handling disorientation and cultural stress? Or does it partake of both? Regardless of the explanation, an upsurge in such activities is related to emerging cultural dissynchronization.

However, many of the symptoms of cultural disorientation we have cited can be related equally to systemic alienation (see below). To develop indicators that are more clearly and uniquely associated with basic nature of a cultural as contrasted with a structural crisis -- namely, the dissynchronization and desacralization of the fundamental patterns of meaning and value in a society -- we shift from the micro or individual level of analysis to the macro or social level.

Macrosocial Indications--Let us reconsider the interaction between the pattern of beliefs, values, perceptions, and symbols -- the "cultural" sector of the society -- and the social structure and processes, represented by the four functional needs and corresponding societal subsystems discussed earlier (pp. 44-5). The basic analatical distinction we have posited between structural and cultural crisis can be stated in terms of the salience of the integrative and latency functions. Thus, for structural dissynchronization the integrative processes are most salient for the maintenance of social continuity under stress, whereas the latency processes operate to manage personal tensions but are not challenged in their role of sustaining cultural patterns and basic value premises. In contrast the latter pressures on pattern maintenance processes are present as a consequence of cultural disorganization. The reason for this difference is that, of all societal processes, those of pattern maintenance are tied most closely to the core values and beliefs and the basic patterns

of meaning and perception for the society. When it is these core elements of the culture that are becoming dissynchronized, the pattern maintenance processes inevitably will become central.

Edward Tiryakian has referred to the crucial role of latency processes in basic societal stability and change in terms fully compatible with the model introduced earlier. His views merit extensive quotation (in these passages we view "societal" and "societal strain" as analogous to our "cultural" and "cultural dissynchronization"):

> We shall use the term "latency" to suggest that in this sector the fundamental but predominantly covert processes of social transformation originate and are disseminated. This sector is the one oriented to the grounds of meaning of the total society, including the basic value premises that articulate the society's perception of reality, and that underlie the organization of major social institutions. It is in the L-structure then, that the fundamental patterns, or structures, of social order are to be located (Ref. 43, p. 80).

> In our model of total societies, we assume that the basic foundation of the social order is essentially a moral (religious-normative) one. That is, the general "way of life" or "world view" of a society is an all-encompassing structure of structures (societal structure) that by virtue of its fundamentality is and must be considered "sacred." Therefore, societal change involves a fundamental redefinition of the situation, a negation of the moral validity of the existent social order and a new basic religious/sacred reorientation that simultaneously is a desacralization of the status quo...

> The religious sphere has a double societal function: to provide the major basis of legitimation for a social order, and to be the major source of inspiration for delegitimizing it. Religion is a major vehicle for both the status quo and societal change. The [non-institucional religious sector] is strategically located as a lever for societal change; religious phenomena, particularly noninstitutional ones (cults, sects, messianic and chiliastic movements, quasi-religious secret societies, etc.) are in the furthest recesses of privacy, in part because they appear so 'irrational' to outsiders. Hence they are a refuge from public scrutiny and

> forms of social control. Whereas, other sectors and institutions may be "corrupted" through processes of compromise inevitable in the process of institutionalization, the noninstitutional religious sphere, by its very nature morally homogeneous, remains intensely pure -- a potential source of social purification... The noninstitutional religious sphere provides the ground for mass (not elite) rejection of the constitutive structure of society* (Ref. 23, pp. 80-81).
>
> To recapitulate, it is in the covert, noninstitutional sphere of society that new basic meanings, innovations or radical renovation of cultural definitions of the situation are generated in reference to societal strains... It is precisely such patterns of sociocultural meaning, having binding implications for various other institutional sectors, that constitute real societal change (Ref. 23, p. 81).

From this analysis of the religious-normative base of the social order, and an investigation of the etiology of such sweeping changes in social order as the Protestant Reformation; the major Western revolutions; and the Industrial Revolution in Britain (the latter being an example of a predominantly nonviolent societal transformation--Ref. 44), Tiryakian has concluded that there are at least two significant "lead indicators," of such phenomena. The first, the basis for which we have cited at length, is:

> Significant increases in the outbreak of noninstitutional religious phenomena ... a religious 'revival' or efferves-cence is an antecedent condition, providing a lead time of about 25 - 35 years (Ref. 23, pp. 94-95).

Noninstitutional religious phenomena include messianic and chiliastic movements, the appearance of new cults and sects, and other religious

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* "Moreover, it is very possible that some of the inspiration for elite-intellectual rejection of the societal order may itself spring from unrecognized religious sources rather than from rational-pragmatic considerations. Such sources need not be identical to those operative in the masses" (Ref. 23, pp. 80-81).

and quasi-religious groups not publically "respectable" (Ref. 23, p. 94). More broadly, they include widespread exploration of new patterns of meaning in individual and social existence, and new styles of individual and group life and purposive activity which can serve as starting points for a new social order. New interpretations of meanings in human experience emerge from explorations in "altered states of consciousness" -- mediation, contemplation, psychedelic or hallucinatory experiences -- and form the basis for new perceptions, inevitably calling into question (desacralizing) the old patterns of meaning and thus the old social order. Indeed, an overtly or covertly "religious" radicalism eventually may emerge that proves instrumental in destroying belief in the legitimacy of the existing social structure. Thus the Protestant Reformation in 16th and 17th century Europe functioned to destroy belief in the "natural" authority of Rome and the "divine right" of kings and thereby fostered political upheaval beyond any anticipation (or desire) of the original religious radicals themselves (Ref. 45, pp. 24-25).

The second lead indicator, which also is related fundamentally to the underlying patterns of meaning and value in a society, and which Tiryakian finds has a lead time of between 10 and 30 years, is:

> Significant increases in the distribution and public acceptance of hedonistic behaviors and symbols of degradation.

These behaviors and symbols include particularly those actions and representations of actions that devalue the humanity of the individual and license irresponsible conduct.

> Social organization involves, among other things, the subordination of various forms of hedonistic gratification (or "consummatory activities" which are by nature self-oriented) to socially constructive, goal-oriented "instrumental" activities. A sudden, significant increase in hedonistic behavior matched with a legitimation and/or a public acceptance of this implies a severe state of <u>anomie</u>; the flaunting of

degradation in public life implies a loss of the normative cohesion of the society in question. It implies a desacralization of the fundamental patterns of meaning. Of course 'tabula rasa' practices are to be found in all societies, but the crucial point is that when the ruling class and the performing arts, which serve an integrative function in the latency sector of a society, can with impunity depict social reality in terms of immediate gratification and symbols of degradation, this is indicative of deep, noninstitutional disturbances in the social structure.

That fundamental societal change brings about a purification in public morality is observable no matter which example one considers: the French Revolution, the English Industrial Revolution, the Soviet, the Chinese Communist, or the Cuban. Thus the purifying, puritanical aspects of revolutionaries or those who assume power in the wake of revolution (e.g., Cromwell, Robespierre, Lenin) may be of crucial appeal to a broad spectrum of the population disillusioned with the failure of the ruling class or governing institutions to control public morality. England escaped the fate of France in the 18th century primarily because English Methodism and the nonconformist churches provided at a strategic time a new ruling, entrepreneurial class characterized by a high degree of asceticism (Ref. 46).

In industrial societies, the disillusionment of a broad spectrum of the population referred to here is likely to be particularly acute among members of the lower and lower middle classes who have maintained a highly self-denying, self-disciplined existence in conformity with moral standards that were previously highly regarded in public life. These persons are likely to become estranged from the larger society; to remove their self-identification from it; and to perceive themselves as outsiders, not represented and not respected or recognized, "in but not of" the society, and thus cut off from being able to affect social conditions (Ref. 47). This is the circumstance of social alienation.

Tiryakian's suggestions for lead times of these two macrosocial indicators were obtained from an examination of historical cases. Whether such time scales will be maintained for modern, rapidly changing post-industrial societies must be considered problematic.

Systemic Dissynchronization

To this point we have focussed attention on cultural dissynchronization, and in particular on the consequences that are more or less directly traceable to the disorganization of the values-beliefs of a society. However, cultural disorganization also has systemic consequences, and on the surface these may develop differently from the cultural symptoms, and may be felt by different individuals.

Furthermore, a society may experience what we have called structural dissynchronization without a basic questioning of its values and beliefs. This circumstance may develop in at least two different ways: first, by changes in the saliency within collectivities in the population of particular values already present in the basic cultural pattern, but hitherto unrealized by these groups (this is the "revolution of rising expectations"); and second, by decremental changes in system performance that violate group expectations. In each of these circumstances, the social system, and in particular its political subsystem which is charged with responsibility for the attainment of collective goals and the management of conflict, comes to be viewed as inconsonant with, or nonsupportive of, an individual's basic system-related values (i.e., that the system is either discriminating against, or is unable to protect or create the conditions requisite for holding or enjoying the values) (Ref. 48, p. 114). This view constitutes a loss of confidence and a growing disaffection with the system.

Below we consider the consequences of such a loss of confidence on both the interactions of the dissatisfied with system authorities (the micro level) and the impact of these interactions and other features of dissynchronization on the overall functioning of social systems (the macro level). Because of its salience in modern societies, particularly during periods of dissynchronization, the political subsystem is our principal focus.

Microsocial Perspective*

During a period of dissynchronization (whether value based or systemically based), different forms of estrangement become widespread in the society and are felt dissimilarly by different individuals, depending on their particular experiences and social history. There are thus reasons to believe that systemic alienation (estrangement from institutions and operative processes of the society) can be specific within individuals to specific subsystems, rather than comprise a monolithic set of cognitive and affective orientations toward the entire social system.

Such selective alienation is particularly pertinent to the political subsystem, which is the primary agency both for collective goal attainment and for social integration under conditions of strain. Thus politics, provides a focus for analyzing actual systemic estrangement at the micro level resulting from dissynchronization.

Attitudes toward politics can be defined in terms of two variables mentioned earlier, trust and efficacy. The efficacy dimension refers to people's perception of their ability to exercise influence on the system, i.e., to increase the probability that the system will deliver desired outcomes. The trust dimension refers to their perception of the necessity for influence to obtain those preferred outcomes, little influence being required in situations of high trust. The level of trust affects the means which individuals will regard as most efficacious to attempt influence, ranging from persuasion for the confident to constraints for the

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* We are grateful to Professor David C. Schwartz for furnishing us a copy of the manuscript of his forthcoming book, Political Alienation and Political Behavior, (Ref. 31), from which much insight on alienation has been drawn. Of course, the uses and interpretations of this material, and especially any errors of fact or distortions of meaning in the summary presented in the next several pages, are the author's responsibility.

disaffected (those who have little hope for desirable outcomes without considerable influence being exerted). Depending on the experience of groups with different means of influence, existing trust orientations may be changed or reinforced and the corresponding perceptions of the efficacy of the different means may be altered (Ref. 28, Chap. 7 and 8).

Several objects of these perceptions can be identified and arranged in a hierarchical ordering, with each level incorporating a generalization of the trust orientation at the previous one. The ordering used here is a synthesis of several previous forms, drawing particularly from Mitchell (Ref. 49, p. 16) and Easton (Ref. 29, pp. 176-200); it is equally applicable to the description of identification or estrangement from the social system if "political" is replaced by "social":

- The particular policies pursued by specific governments
- The incumbent leaders and other personnel who operate the polity and government
- The formal laws and the norms of political procedure
- The polity itself (processes, institutions, structures)
- The political values that the polity presumably attempts to honor and realize and that justify the political institutions
- The political community, that collectivity bound together by a "political division of labor . . . in a common political enterprise" (Ref. 29, pp. 176-177).

Political alienation, which Schwartz defines as "an attitude of separation or estrangement between the self and the polity" (Ref. 50, Chap. I), involves at a minimum the processes and institutional arrangements of the political subsystem, which implies distrust that has generalized through at least the first three levels listed above (policies, incumbents, and specific laws). Furthermore, alienation is not simply a matter of severe distrust and disaffection but also involves a perceived

inability to alter the disaffecting conditions through any of the means of influence when exercised in ways defined as acceptable by the norms (laws) of the system. Thus Schwartz has hypothesized that political alienation results from the simultaneous perception by the individual of three conditions (Ref. 51):

(1) A perceived threatening value conflict (TVC) "between an individual's fundamental politicized values" (those values that he has come to expect to be realized, supported, or protected by the performance of the political system, such as social justice or maintenance of order) and "those seen as represented by the polity" (Ref. 52). This is the condition of disaffection from the political system.

(2) A perceived personal inefficacy (PI) in relation to the polity such that the individual sees himself as unable, by his own efforts, to reduce the conflict by changing the polity and thereby reforming the alienating condition.

(3) "A perceived systemic inefficacy (SI) such that the political system as a whole is seen to be thwarting and blocking the individual's value satisfaction and no [political reference group (e.g., union, representative interest group, etc.) or other] self-surrogate exists in the political system that can resolve the value conflict (i.e., reform the alienating situation)" (Ref. 50, Chap. 4, p. 3).

Because by definition the alienated individual (or reference group) finds it inefficacious to attempt influence through the usual means and channels, other descriptions than those for the normal influence processes need to be used to encompass the responses of individuals to the condition of alienation. Schwartz describes the basic behavioral orientations that an individual (or group) may hold toward the polity in terms of the classic enumeration of Merton--conformity, ritualism, reformism, revolutionism, and retreatism or withdrawal--only the first of which is not relevant to alienated behavior (Ref. 53, p. 139).

The remaining major premises of his theory (all of which have received empirical support as described in Ref. 50) can now be summarized:

- The level of an individual's political alienation and the process by which that level was reached, are significantly related to the basic behavioral orientation toward politics that he is likely to adopt--predicting especially well to the nonconformist orientations (Ref. 54).

- Individuals who (1) perceive personal and systemic inefficacy (PI, SI) under the condition of a threatening value conflict (TVC) but who (2) also place high personal value on political participation (VP), are likely to maintain their participant orientation to politics by shifting allegiance to radical or revolutionary alternatives--i.e., alienated reformism (Ref. 50, Chap. I, p. 50).

- Individuals in upper socioeconomic categories are likely to be significantly more active in their orientations to politics than are those in the lower social strata. Also, alienated individuals who are high in energy, anger, psychological comfort with their own anger, and sense of social and political invulnerability to reprisals--and low in need for conformity and desire to be reintegrated with the polity (to stop being alienated)--tend to be significantly more activist in behavioral orientation to politics than are individuals who are characterized by the opposite personality set (Ref. 50, Chap. I, p. 50).

- Political alienation tends to be significantly associated with a predisposition to seek information (i.e., stimulation) from nonsystem or antisystem media and groups. Levels of political alienation predict to the individual's information-seeking and political communications behavior (Ref. 50, Chap. XIV, p. 1).

- Such media and groups arouse and channel political behavior by activating basic behavioral orientations (Ref. 50, Chap. XIV, p. 1) . . . the individual will reinvest the identification he withdrew from the political system (and its leaders, groups, ideologies, etc.) if the counter-elites, counter-groups, counter-cultures that are bidding for his support convince him that his value conflict and his perceptions of inefficacy will thereby be reduced or reversed (Ref. 50, Chap. I, pp. 53-54) . . . [the extent to which they are successful then] predicts to the likely directions of his political behavior, if any behavior occurs.

> The arousal level induced by the communications of the leaders or groups predicts to the likelihood of such overt behavior (Ref. 50, Chap. XIV, p. 1).

Using these propositions, the microdynamics of systemic dissynchronization can now be described in a form particularly relevant to recent American experience.

Reformism and Alienation--In our conception, a condition of increasing dissynchronization in a society has, among other consequences, the effect of generating a growing number of members whose expectation from normal political operations of outcomes that are congruent with their value-beliefs is decreasing. Those individuals and groups for whom such value conflicts are sufficiently basic, and hence threatening, and who at the same time feel effective in the polity, will initiate reformist activity--actions in compliance with the existing norms of political behavior that are aimed at changing the particular elements of the political system, or of the social system through the polity, believed to be responsible for the value conflict.

Under conditions of dissynchronization, these preliminary attempts are unlikely to succeed, because both the analyses and proposals of reformers and the initiatives and responses of authorities will be those relevant to synchronized conditions, where the dominant perceptions and beliefs are still viable and the adaptive and self-regulating capabilities of the system can be relied upon to manage conflict effectively without special intervention. Among the normal responses of authorities will be efforts to limit the ability of reformers to exert influence over areas in which they make binding decisions, simply in order to maintain their own freedom of action. However, these "normal operations"--which in dealing with attempts at persuasion include restrictions to "proper channels," withholding or distorting information, and denying or passing

on responsibility for decisions--will tend gradually to generate perceptions of both personal and systemic inefficacy on the part of reformers and will have the effect of isolating authorities from awareness of the necessity of reform.

Since political systems are complex, and initial and continuing socialization promotes positive identification with the several levels of the system, reformers may be slow to recognize such inefficacy. However, as their increasingly more intensive and more costly efforts to exert influence through existing channels continually fail to reduce their value conflict and distrust, and as they continue to eliminate distinguishable elements and levels of a political system as possible sources of the conflict (Ref. 48, p. 116), they will experience a growing sense of disillusionment and betrayal that will tend to generalize to the polity as a whole and perhaps beyond, to the values it presumably embodies and eventually to the political community.

Meanwhile, those who from the beginning of their perception of value conflict simultaneously felt inefficacious in the polity will have tended to become alienated directly, without the (enlightening and disillusioning) experiences of reformists. In both cases, as a result of their value conflict, sense of inefficacy, and separation from the polity, there circulates within the resulting alienated groups (and within isolated alienated individuals) a sense of threat; futility; suspicion and distrust; loss of community; and a syndrome of frustration, aggression, rage, and tension. These negative emotions are likely to be enhanced if the structural sources of alienation are associated with a growing cultural disorganization since, as we have seen, this creates a circulating reservoir of free-floating anxiety that can be fixed on politics (Ref. 48, p. 115). This may help to explain why revolutions associated with cultural transformations have been so violent.)

Radicalization of Reformist Activity--If the more traditional and sanctioned routes to direct reform from within prove ineffective or unavailable, alienation will develop. However, in its early stages, the alienation is likely to be partial--an estrangement from particular institutional components of the system (e.g., particular governmental bodies or units) that are perceived to be fostering the alienating situation but that are viewed as potentially alterable, if not from within then from without. In this circumstance, the reformist impulse becomes more active and is directed at pursuits outside the separable institutions and the scope of their control. These pursuits are intended simultaneously to exercise constraint influence on the resistant institutions and, more importantly, to mobilize the political community toward their reform. Such pursuits include the highly visible forms of public protest--marches, demonstrations, civil disobedience--often inviting counteraction (including violence) by authorities in order to increase the impact of the appeal to the community as a whole.

The emergence and growth of reformist protest also has the effect of making private value conflicts public. Many persons with value conflicts may conform because they believe others lack such conflicts; the existence of open protest tends to undermine this "pluralistic ignorance" and encourage the disaffected to express themselves. Furthermore, examples of open protest can provide models of alternative expressions and educate the disaffected in the requisite skills (Ref. 55, p. 134). These factors increase the extent of reformist protest and encourage the growth of reformist groups.

Reformist activities may be punctuated by outbursts of group violence expressing the distrust, frustration, aggression, and rage that escalate with the perceived slow effect* of such efforts ("Freedom Now!"). In accordance with the factors governing behavioral expression of alienation given earlier, those persons participating in riotous behavior are more likely to be those who feel high energy, a sense of security and awareness, and have an emergent but as yet unrealized desire to participate effectively in the society and the polity (Ref. 56).

At the same time, intellectuals who also perceive basic, hence threatening value conflicts, and who identify with the objectives of the protesters begin to develop explanations and rationales for what is happening in the society. If the society is entering a cultural (value-oriented) rather than a basically structural crisis, intellectual criticism of the society will become prominent long before the emergence of widespread mass protests (if such protests are permitted by the regime). Critical intellectuals will be motivated both by value conflict and by their particular inability to withdraw from interaction with communications media, which present evidence of social processes and hence the conflict (Ref. 57). Their response to continuing conflict will be to launch widespread censure of the nature and appropriateness of the existing society, polity, culture, morals, art, philosophy, and so forth. What may begin as a latent vague malaise in the society becomes intellectualized, hence manifest and potentially politicizable (Ref. 48, pp. 119-20).

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* Such impatience will increase with perceived closeness to the goal, as de Tocqueville observed so clearly in the French Revolution; see also Gurr (Ref. 34).

The products of these intellectual activities become incorporated in the appeals for support of alienated reformist and potentially revolutionary groups. Indeed, if the efforts of such groups to reform and alter the polity fail because of system blockages, then the alienation of intellectuals who identify with the goals of such groups will increase. This increase is accompanied by a growth in intensity and pervasiveness of their criticism, which expands to question the legitimacy of the political system, and even the religio-normative base of the entire social order. If the society is entering a period of cultural disorganization, such criticism will provide a basis for desacralizing the existing grounds of meaning and value that are supportive of the current social order; it also will supplement and abet the basically "religious" reformulations of meaning and value in the crisis, and will point toward alternative value systems (which take the form of ideologies on a political level).

In a society where dissynchronization is severely impairing the collective efficiency of the political system, activist reformers will be likely to fail again to achieve their objectives, although changes may occur in the political community which will subsequently prove significant. There are several factors that can lead to this failure. First, the character of the disorganization may be more fundamental than either the programs of the activists or the responses and policies of authorities have yet addressed. Second, the disability of the system itself that arises from dissynchronization and the escalation of demands from disaffected groups will diminish its capacity to adapt. Third, the actions of activist groups seeking to reform the polity may generate negative (undesirable) as well as positive influence on political decisions. Thus they may create active resistance among authorities, who may be led "to 'punish' a group by withholding preferred outcomes and to protect and reward the group's adversaries" (Ref. 28, p. 71). Also, reformers tend to mobilize other groups into political activity, groups that are perhaps

equally disaffected and estranged but have opposing interests and objectives. The latter may be encouraged by authorities so as to generate countervailing pressures, increase their own valued freedom of action, and justify the refusal to undertake difficult or unwelcome reforms (Ref. 28, p. 140).

Beyond attempts to reduce or contain burdens on them, authorities may also act in partisan ways to frankly and willfully pursue reactionary policies--that is, "policies which exacerbate rather than rectify a dissynchronized social structure, or policies that violate the formal, envalued norms of the system which the authorities are charged with preserving" (Ref. 14, p. 94). Such intransigence always serves to sharply increase the extent and the threatening aspects of value conflict with the system and the perceived ineffectiveness of attempts to reform it. It also has the effect of discrediting the political values used to justify the system.

Failures of activist reforms generalize the estrangement of both the reformers and the passively alienated who favor reform to encompass the entire political subsystem. This is particularly serious for democratic systems, whose supporting values include a stress on the consent of the governed and both the right and the supposed effectiveness of "petitioning for a redress of grievances." When the alienated exercise such rights but perceive no positive effects, they experience further increases in frustration, rage, threat, and tension. With a sense of futility toward any reform, some groups in the society may generalize their alienation to the political community itself and propose secession from it.

Those among the alienated who have high energy, a sense of security, anger, comfort with their own anger, and low need for conformity will tend toward radical or revolutionary orientations to the polity. Once the number of the alienated grows past a critical threshold of mutual

awareness (which may be low if the alienated are geographically concentrated and are innately rather isolated from the polity), individuals who in addition to the above characteristics place a high value on participation (Ref. 55) will begin to focus their radical efforts around organization and building movements (Ref. 58). Meanwhile, those in neither camp will tend toward passive orientations, either ritualism or withdrawal. Nevertheless, many of those who participate ritualistically in the existing polity and who perceive alienated reformist groups with goals that would reduce their threatening value conflict, will identify with those goals despite their passive orientation toward participation in them.

As alienated reformist groups organize and formulate appeals for support, and as increases in alienation occur because of increasing perceived personal and systemic inefficacy and value conflict, so the seeking of information from radical and revolutionary sources will increase. New sources will appear (pamphlets,* underground newspapers, folk music, radio broadcasts and other media expressing alienation and radical themes), making use of the criticisms by intellectuals and proposing radical explanations and remedies for value conflict and inefficacy. By these means the alienated "find each other" and can join together. Indeed through these media, radical--and with increasing alienation, overtly revolutionary--groups attempt to convince the potentially mobilizable (those with lesser but still moderately high energy, felt security and participative values) to join them rather than to drop out or persist ritualistically within the system. Such appeals will succeed to the extent that they convince the unmobilized that the countergroup is less threatening and more effective for realization of their values than either

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* A favorite "underground" medium of the American Revolutionary War.

the existing system or other antisystem groups and that it can furnish a new sense of community and group support as well as an explanation for the loss of the old (Ref. 59, p. 123).*

Emergence and Growth of Ideologies--Appeals to the passively alienated constitute the beginnings of an ideology, which we may define as an alternative elementary value-belief system together with proposed means for achieving it. That is, an ideology includes a set of beliefs, values, and perceptions of the social system (usually more broadly defined than the political arena alone) that is alternative to those embodied in the existing system. Wallace terms this the "goal culture" of the ideology (Ref. 15, p. 192). Such alternative systems become salient only when a social system is vulnerable to attacks on its values and institutions, i.e., only when it is laboring under dissynchronization. Indeed, the penetration of ideologies from marginal groups to widespread circulation among those hitherto most involved and committed to the existing order is a clear indicator of dissynchronization (Ref. 14, p. 84).

In its role in effective revolutionary appeals, an ideology will provide the persons experiencing threatening value conflicts with a new perspective from which to evaluate their situation--a perspective that is intended to make manifest the (perhaps latent) sources of the conflict--thereby reducing their attachment to the existing system. Consequently, as with intellectual criticism, the growth and spread of ideologies can be expected to increase the level of alienation among the persons experiencing such value conflicts.

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* An additional factor which such groups could utilize in appeals would be the suggestion that the group will "permit or encourage the more or less direct outplay of aggression or rage (usually by creating a scapegoat)" (Ref. 48, p. 123).

For an ideology to appear useful in the reduction of the conflict, it also must have a program of operations that is perceived as potentially practical for transforming the present society into the desired one. Wallace calls this the "transfer culture" (Ref. 15, p. 192). Because the perception of efficacy is so significant in the formation and maintenance of an antisystem group (which exists in a generally hostile environment, including competition from other such groups), the group generally will be subject to constant internal disputes about strategies and tactics (the "transfer culture"), and these are likely to become especially acute if earlier strategies prove ineffective. Since in the early stages of formation of radical and revolutionary groups there is little mass support for any one of them, there is little sense of loss in leaving one and joining (or forming) another. Thus alienated reformist and revolutionary groups will fission and proliferate as alienation and especially as perceived inefficacy increase (Ref. 48, p. 125, and Ref. 14, pp. 82-83).

Indeed, this situation represents a key point in the development of revolutionary responses to dissynchronization. If no one organization or ideology comes to be perceived as efficacious for reordering the social system to reduce value conflict, the entire idea of revolutionary or radical reform gradually may become viewed as fallacious, and--tired and disillusioned--members of radical organizations may rapidly begin to drop out into a passive orientation or even move back toward a more conventional reformism. We do not suggest that they are likely to alter their own basic values, at least in the short run, to conform with those expressed in the polity. Nonetheless, individuals leaving radical organizations who have high or even moderate affiliative needs or who come to see alternative strategies to obtain efficacy within the existing system will move toward a less radical and--with perceived efficacy--a more reformist orientation to achieve those values.

If, however, one of the radical organizations achieves a critical minimum of public support, there will be a "bandwagon" effect in which to remain passive or associated with other organizations would appear comparatively inefficacious, and so a rapid increase in membership in or allegiance to this organization and its program (ideology) develops among the alienated (Ref. 48, p. 125).

From this point on, the society is split into two main parts, and the movement toward revolution gains momentum with a sharp increase in social polarization. The remaining stages of this process, which have been widely discussed (Ref. 48, pp. 125-29; Ref. 14, Chapters V and VII; and the other works listed in Ref. 61), are best viewed from the macrosocial perspective. However, Schwartz's conclusion from the microsocial vantage point stands out in its implications for government policy:

> . . . it does seem both clear and important that the failure of non-violent politics causes the transition to internal war (Ref. 48, p. 128).

Macrosocial Perspective

In contrast to the micro perspective, the macro perspective emphasizes social subsystems as wholes and their capabilities to achieve their functional objectives so as to ensure the survival, or the adjustment, or the maintenance of the complete social system. Under this heading we consider indications of dissynchronization both for social subsystems in general and for the political subsystem in particular.

For social subsystems in general, the behavior of members is governed by social norms. Norms are specific rules, with positive and negative sanctions attached, that guide the allocation and assignment of each role in the society or identify the ranges of behavior deemed appropriate or inappropriate to that role. They are elaborated and made morally acceptable (legitimated) in accordance with the subsystem's institutionalized

value structure. In societies with nearly perfect synchronization, the rules of behavior would hardly appear to be rules at all, and the enactment of new rules would reflect consensus more than conflict. In contrast, for societies undergoing dissynchronization and its attendant decline of trust and efficiency, norms--and particularly institutionalized norms such as laws--will have a much higher and increasing degree of saliency:

> At times when values are insecure as a result of social change, norms themselves--partially legitimized by the crumbling value structure but also buttressed by coercive enforcement--become the basic principles for organizing the work of the society (Ref. 14, p. 43).

This trend becomes evident in several ways. The most obvious is the increasingly frequent violation of social and legal norms that accompanies the growth of passive alienation and its mood of frustration and aggression (Ref. 48, p. 117). Accompanying this, and promoted frequently by intellectual critics and protestors of the existing society, is a major focussing of attention and argument on existing norms that are no longer perceived to rest on the solid foundation of congruent values and institutions. Indeed, as dissynchronization and alienation increase

> . . . the envalued definitions of crime and sickness--that is, the outer limits on personality variability--are relaxed . . . it becomes increasingly more difficult for other actors in the system to distinguish between behavior that represents a dysfunction-inspired protest and behavior that represents the now-disguised deviance of a formerly eccentric personality (Ref. 60, pp. 75-76).

A less obvious indicator of the growing reliance on norms for social integration arises from the patchwork attempts by authorities to relieve manifest social strains generated by dissynchronization. Specific interventions and correctives are applied in the system in an unconnected fashion to guide and direct the behavior of individuals and groups toward

more appropriate actions than they would otherwise perform under their existing values and beliefs. Such activities represent primarily the normal self-regulating processes of the system attempting to resolve problems that have grown beyond their capacity to handle, although they may also be the beginnings of attempts to devise policies to achieve developmental structural change. In a complex society, these processes can result in a subtle proliferation of institutional norms and bureaucratic structures that unconsciously are intended to bridge the growing gaps among the value structure, the social system, and the societal environment.

Included in such attempts are the uses of economic inducements and legal constraints to encourage and impel socially appropriate and beneficial behavior on the part of private individuals, organizations, and subordinate government institutions. Similar behaviors under nearly synchronized conditions normally would arise directly from personally-felt norms and decentralized institutional processes, or through persuasion and activation of commitments by societal leadership. The shift to inducements or constraints requires a great increase in the resources that the system must expend to maintain integration. Increased costs are even more marked in cases where the government intervenes directly to take actions that private individuals or institutions will not undertake under the existing values and institutional framework, but that are perceived to be important for the continued viability or improvement of the social order. All these forms of intervention tend to be greatly stimulated by reformist and radical protest as ways to meet or deflect these demands and thus relieve the influence pressure they generate on authorities.

Normative problems are made more difficult under conditions of cultural as distinct from purely structural dissynchronization. The former situation has more generalized tension and free-floating anxiety which can be released in activities that deviate from existing system norms,

and the more severe dislocations of system functioning due to cultural dissynchronization require more intervention and corrective action than do the simpler difficulties under structural disequilibrium only. Indeed, the emergence of systemic dysfunctions of increasing severity that threaten to grow to the point of overwhelming the adaptive capacity of the social system and its political subsystem to manage and alleviate them is an indication in its own right of dissynchronization. Dysfunctions tend to arise first in subsystems that are focal points of the dissynchronization and are more susceptible to it. However, if they are not or cannot be resolved within these subsystems, they will gradually generalize to others that initially remained functional.

To obtain greater specificity on the development of systemic dysfunctions it is necessary to consider individual subsystems. This is done for nonpolitical subsystems in Volume II. In the present discussion we again choose to limit ourselves mainly to an examination of the political subsystem for its roles in societal integration, collective goal attainment, and conflict management.

Power Deflation--In our examination of functions of the political subsystem, particularly in collective goal attainment, we suggested that its effectiveness depends critically on the "loan" of power to the system by its members--the loan of the right to specify future binding obligations on them without circumscribing the use of that loan. In turn, the system's "credit rating" for such loans, and thus its ability to expand its operations by making new commitments and specifying new binding obligations to enable their fulfillment, is determined by the level of members' trust in the system.

When dissynchronization and associated dysfunctions begin to emerge, the new commitments and binding obligations are likely to be, in essence, patchwork interventions and corrections to relieve strain. Because these efforts are addressed more to symptoms than to causes of dysfunction, they are unlikely to succeed, and therefore they will tend to extend the political system's obligations beyond its organizational capacity to fulfill them and give members a proper return on their loan of power. Furthermore, both this inability to deliver and the increasing complexity of social subsystems will stimulate perceptions of increasing inefficacy among authorities as well as their constituents. These perceptions become embodied in growing generalized beliefs either that the entire system may be "out of control" even of the political elite supposedly in charge and that no one knows any longer what to do or how to accomplish it, or that the actual control resides with a covert group of the elite whose activities usually are so secret as to go unnoticed. Perceptions of systemic inefficacy at this stage will begin to circulate freely among system constituents (they may even gradually spread to the bureaucracy and elements of the political elite itself) inducing alienation and radicalization among those having basic value conflicts with the existing system and its outputs and a transfer of allegiance among some of these to causes--and later, ideologies--of emerging alienated radical groups. These processes tend to follow the previous outline of the increasing alienation of system constituents and its generalization to the entire political system as currently structured.

One consequence of political authorities having responsibility for decisions not specifically authorized by the system's constituency is that a functioning political leadership, like a bank management, is always unable to meet all its formal commitments if there is an insistence on their fulfillment too rapidly (Ref. 26, p. 60). The decline of trust in the system's capacity or willingness to deliver on its obligations (its

credit rating) has the effect of stimulating groups to attempt influence and test their own and the system's efficacy by demanding that immediate and explicit fulfillment of commitments to them be achieved through the exercise of systemic power. Since all of the system's obligations are presumed to be legitimate--i.e., appropriate or "right" in terms of the institutionalized values of system--such a demand is expected to be met.

> On the other hand, if it is not met or if the difficulty of meeting it creates a question of the capacity of the system to meet its general obligations, it may (not necessarily must) motivate other units to present demands they would not otherwise have presented at this time. If such a process once gets underway, it may enter into a vicious-circle pattern. That is, each assertion of demands for collective decision, for satisfaction of interests that would not ordinarily have been presented, will stimulate other units to assert their demands. There can then develop a cumulative pressure on the relevant collectivities. The general type of response will then be twofold. First, an increasingly stringent scale of priorities of what can and cannot be done will be set up; second, increasingly severe negative sanctions for noncompliance with collective decisions will be imposed. (Ref. 26, pp. 59-60).

The self-protecting responses of the system can have the unfortunate effect of increasing popular distrust and estrangement. The authorities are most likely to set up the priorities so as to decrease discontent among those with the greatest resources to exert influence, and to leave those with the least ability to influence as the most discontented (Ref. 28, p. 114). Among the latter this can create or emphasize the impression of considerable bias in the system, increase perceived inefficacy, and exacerbate alienation. Furthermore, increasing coercive sanctions leads in the direction of threats of force to deter the most vociferous demanders who are at the same time low on the priority scale. This use of coercion will be perceived as legitimate, since the objective incapacity of the system to fulfill all the (legitimate) demands within a short time is also felt to be legitimate (Ref. 26, p. 64). However,

it requires the system to divert to this use resources urgently needed to meet its high priority commitments, which further decreases its general capabilities (systemic power), and hence its overall effectiveness (Ref. 28, p. 45).

This overall process Parsons calls "power deflation." It has two basic symptoms. The first is an increasing tendency on the part of the system members not only to refuse to enter into new commitments to the system or to follow through on previous commitments, including participation* (i.e., a refusal to loan it power), but also to take positive measures to obstruct the system's operation. This symptom corresponds to the exercise of constraint or coercive influence on the system by its members. The second symptom is a parallel increase in the system's reliance upon coercion, culminating in the threatened use of force, to obtain the performance of binding obligations and to exercise countersanctions against constraint influence. Since coercion is considerably more costly than persuasion, this shift in the modes of political interaction brings about a general contraction of the resources that remain available for the attainment of both individual or group and collective goals.

Crisis of Legitimacy--With the decline of trust and the attendant growth of alienation, the legitimation of the political system becomes critical as the highest normative defense against breakdown. Legitimation is the articulation of authority with the society's value structure. For modern pluralistic societies, this articulation leads to at least three associated perceptions of a power system that tend to reinforce the legitimacy of its authority:

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* Such distrust and withdrawal also will generalize to other societal subsystems, including the economic system.

- The exercise of authority is perceived to be effective in attaining collective goals which are in the long run beneficial to groups, institutions or values to which the present system members are committed.

- The exercise of authority is perceived to be equitable (fair and just), that is, that the incumbent authorities are not biased against one or that their operation does not result in special costs for oneself or one's group.

- There is perceived to be a generalized consensus supporting this exercise of authority as being legitimate, manifested through expressions of popular opinion or the ease with which authorities meeting negative response can call upon the backing of other centers of power in the society (Ref. 55, pp. 131-133).

These conditions are closely related to those governing the level of trust of particular partisan groups in the population, as seen from the micro perspective. Thus the growth of alienated political behaviors, the apparent increase in bias and decrease of effectiveness of the political system in a power deflation, and the attendant spread of mutual distrust and hostility will encourage the growth of challenges to legitimacy, first from among those of the alienated who feel most oppressed and least able to get favorable outcomes from the system. Especially for those having a neutral or questioning attitude toward the system during this period of dissynchronization, but who are in general supportive of its legitimacy (for want of better alternatives as much as for the fulfillment of the previous conditions), one aspect of perceived system effectiveness is particularly important. This is whether the system has the capacity and whether its leaders or the social classes from which they are drawn have the wisdom, the will and the abilities necessary to achieve systemic resynchronization with values and environment and thus to reduce the tensions of individuals and groups and lay down a new foundation of mutual trust and cooperation in the society. It is a question of confidence in future improvements. If this confidence can

be maintained while effective policies to achieve resynchronization are developed and implemented, the power deflation will decrease and the society will move back from the brink of revolution or tyranny.

On the other hand, in the absence of such hope, the loss of trust and the increasing awareness of discontent attendant on growing alienation and power deflation will tend to threaten the supports for system legitimacy. Authorities may come to be seen as ignorant, incompetent, or biased for acting out the existing values and envalued definitions of their roles without taking extraordinary steps to wrestle with the root problems of dissynchronization. The growing doubt about systemic effectiveness may be increased if the leadership vacillates and displays uncertainty and inconsistency about what actions are needed, particularly as they view the inadequacy or failure of their patchwork attempts to resolve social dysfunctions. Alienation-induced increases in acts of noncompliance reveal the lack of a supportive consensus for the system and provide models for effective resistance. Finally, institutional leaders may refuse to support the legitimacy of government authority, perhaps the most significant accelerator of popular disaffection (Ref. 55, p. 135). All these factors will foster growing challenges to system legitimacy, which may begin to spread throughout the entire system. If these developments continue to the point where the authoritative use of force by the principal constitutional organs of government is no longer held to be legitimate by a majority of the system's members, a loss of authority will ensue, and the ability of government officeholders to supervise and command will come to rest only on their control of superior force. This is the final stage of power deflation in which the activation of commitments to the general support of the political system proves futile. If there is no apparent prospect of even a gradual change in this situation, the society is on the brink of revolution or totalitarian rule (Ref. 14, pp. 31-32).

A loss of authority may or may not in fact lead to a revolution. From the point of view of the system as a whole, so long as its leadership can continue to coerce social interaction successfully, it will continue to exist. "However, the power deflation will approach maximum proportions, producing a 'police state'" (Ref. 14, p. 91). In general, for a revolution to be launched under these circumstances, two conditions must be satisfied. First, there must be a transfer of identification and allegiance of the disaffected to a revolutionary group of the alienated on the basis of a plausible claim that it alone will be able to achieve resynchronization and develop a new foundation of legitimacy. And second, there must occur some event that exposes the inability of the existing government to maintain a monopoly of effective force (such as a breakdown in the effectiveness of the armed forces). If a revolution does occur, the task of achieving resynchronization will develop upon the revolutionary leadership, which in the absence of a foundation of trust and legitimacy may be required to rely on coercion and naked force to maintain societal integration for a considerable period while the bases of trust, confidence, and appropriateness of the new order are being laid.

Other Macrosocial Indications--Paralleling Tiryakian's attempt to determine lead indicators of basic cultural change at the macro level, we suggest that the patterns of development of alienation, systemic dysfunctions and power deflation form strong indicators of decreasing social stability. A number of additional consequences can be obtained as the aggregate of various responses to these factors at the micro level, particularly among those individuals and groups whose orientations to social action are passive rather than reformist and who, therefore, tend to withdraw from meaningful participation, support, and commitment for collective activities as their estrangement increases. The growth of passive alienation and the associated mood of frustration, plus the loss of a

stable envalued definition of behavioral norms in a synchronized value-belief pattern, lead to macrosocial behavioral symptoms and systemic responses that have been cited by many investigators as leading indicators of structural crisis and change (Ref. 61). Among these are:

- "Individuation, privatization, reduction in the scope of loyalties, a sense of public purposelessness, nonvoting, decrease in political interactions (as in membership and organizations)" (Ref. 48, p. 117).

- An increase in restlessness in the society, manifested in "aimless interactions" and "purposeless activity" (Ref. 62). Individual restlessness tends to spread and become social, as is evidenced by "the wandering of attention from one individual object, or line of action to another . . ." (Ref. 63, p. 271).

- An increase in crime, especially violent crime (Ref. 64).

- An increase in personal "disorders"--mental disturbance, suicide, vice (Ref. 63, p. 271)--spreading to become social (compare Ref. 15, pp. 191-192).

- An increase in the frequency with which legal authorities, through the police and armed forces, are called upon to coerce social interaction, and a subsequent growth in the size and financial support of legal and enforcement mechanisms in relation to the size of the total population needed to sustain this increase (Ref. 14, pp. 126-131).

- Increased generalized tension (Ref. 63).

- Real as well as perceived "loss of community" (Ref. 48, p. 117).

Since individuals possess considerable capacity to manage tensions internally before manifesting them socially, a strong pattern of simultaneous growth in these variables is significant. If our hypothesis is correct that alienation is a consequence of increasing dissynchronization among core values, social structure and societal environment and is significantly greater under cultural dissynchronization, then a strong rise in these variables should be paralleled by the appearance of increasingly

severe dysfunctions of existing institutions and social processes. Such dysfunctions will gradually appear in all major social institutions under conditions of cultural dissynchronization, but may be restricted to only a subset if the dissynchronization is predominantly structural. In either case, however, a simultaneous rise in alienation and systemic dysfunction is a strong warning of severe strain and approaching structural transformations.

## Conclusion

It was suggested earlier that among the various sources or stimuli for social change, the most significant for an understanding of present conditions in western cultures, especially the United States, are endogenous changes in organized knowledge and its applications. Through his science and technology mankind in this century has passed the threshold of acquiring "Faustian powers"--the capability to intervene in the course of evolution of all life on this planet. Many voices have begun to be raised in anger over what amounts to the failure in this situation of western society's dominant premises, operational values, and institutions to change in congruence with each other and with the changing limitations and demands of the environment (psychological, ecological, intersocietal).

Such voices are not wholly new in America or elsewhere in western society; since before the Revolution radicals have decried failures of American society both to keep pace with reality and keep faith with its declared values. What is new is the wide range of groups and causes that are involved and the depth, pervasiveness, and interconnectedness of the concerns expressed. The concepts and characterizations of social change developed earlier would suggest that the United States in recent years has been experiencing considerable and perhaps increasing dissynchronization.

The testing of the hypothesis of increasing dissynchronization is the principal concern of the third section of this report, which appears in Volume II. We can obtain some immediate grasp of the applicability of the framework and dynamics, however, by comparing its description of the emergence of the "politics of alienation" with the historical account of the emergence of the contemporary "counterculture" presented in the first section. This analysis will demonstrate in particular that student radicalism is not adequately explained by psychological causation alone,

but that "student radicalism has developed within a social, a cultural and, above all, a political context." (Section I, p. 22).

## Contemporary Radicalism as an Expression of Dissynchronization

The suggested rationale of Section I for the development of contemporary radicalism reflects a process of growth and generalization of political alienation which derives from particular circumstances and manifestations of dissynchronization in America since the Depression.

The citizens and leaders who comprise the collectivity labeled "no special action called for" in the diagram of premises (Fig. 1, p. 23) are those who either have little value conflict with the American polity or a perception of sufficient efficacy that they identify closely with the polity. They maintain in effect that the normal homeostatic processes of our society are sufficient to effect necessary change, and the values, institutions, and environment of our society are sufficiently congruent that no extraordinary policies to facilitate the restoration of equilibrium are necessary.

The stage called "acceleration of social change" in Fig. 1 had its immediate origins in certain policies that national political (legal) authorities undertook in order to resynchronize certain social relationships in American society on a new basis--particularly racial equality. The need for these policies arose as a result of exogenous and endogenous changes in social processes during and after World War II and lead to the requirement for still further change to regain stability:

> These sources included the mobilizing experiences of Negro soldiers and domestic migrants during World War II, the rise of reference groups in the form of socially mobile Negroes in America and of Negro African republics with representatives in the United Nations, basic changes in the division of labor of the southeastern states, and several others. The effect of these sources of change was to mobilize

> a large, chiefly urban Negro population which came to have values roughly identical with those existing in the general society. Given these values, the Negro could no longer continue to accept assignments to roles in the division of labor which were not based on general achievement criteria. Similarly, he had to protest, as any normally socialized American would have, those processes which worked to exclude him from political participation, economic markets, and equal educational opportunities. These processes no longer cohered with his value structure, and they thereby became illegitimate (Ref. 14, p. 72).

This passage indicates the effect of reference groups both internal and external to the society, in creating reverberatory value changes and consequent threatening value conflicts with elements of the polity and social structure.

Because most blacks explicitly identified with the national polity and its articulated supporting values, and felt efficacy (from Supreme Court actions) in mobilizing national action, early alienation in the Civil Rights movement was restricted to local political units, almost entirely in the Southern states. This triggered the direct action campaigns from 1955 to 1960 which were attempts to constrain local officials through legitimate means to abide by the emerging national racial policy, and to mobilize the national polity to the reform of local grievances.

With the failure of initial efforts at change, the blacks' increasing perception of value conflict and of inefficacy triggered a second period of acceleration with increased protest. White direct action also emerged in this second period modeled on the black experience. Widespread and growing value conflict with the society and polity had existed among white students in the 1950s, as we shall see in Volume II, but perceived inefficacy had lead to passive alienation. The perception of new effective means gave active expression of this disaffection, which increased as a result of participation with blacks in reformist protest and

consequently increased value conflicts with--and the perceived inefficacy of direct reform of--local government units. This period also marked the appearance of large numbers of students having the high energy, self-confidence and other characteristics that Schwartz has identified as leading to more active behavioral orientations in politics (Ref. 65, pp. 60-62, 70-72). Issues became generalized in this period but were still expressed basically as matters of policy reform. There also developed the beginnings of an ideology to support black demands, which envisioned a society of equality (most vividly portrayed in Martin Luther King's speech to the 1963 March on Washington) and proposed direct but nonviolent action as the means for achieving it.

The "resistance to the acceleration of social change" during the years 1954 to 1964 arose from a number of causes: (1) the intransigence of local leadership; (2) the opposition to the changes which resulted from the mobilization of white groups with opposing values; and (3) the usual attempts by authorities to contain efforts at influence and to prevent widespread modification of local existing policies and social norms (the "bureaucratic attitude"), resulting in their isolation from the need for change ("official indifference"). In response to the tensions of disappointed hopes, threatening value conflict and inefficacy and resulting alienation, a number of approaches emerged to relieve tension and provide group support among youth. These focussed on a much more definite youth culture with a new common language, a new set of symbols and new media, and a distinctive dress. The most markedly distinct aspect (at least initially) of this subculture, which expressed both the growth and generalization of alienation and a perceived cultural disorganization in contemporary America, was the appearance and rapid spread of noninstitutional religious and quasireligious phenomena, including the use of chemical and meditative techniques of altering consciousness.

The "loss of faith" in traditional political processes resulted and a similar although smaller rise in alienation also developed among adults during the same period. Expressions of loss of a sense of wider community were increasingly communicated among alienated youth (both active and passive) through the youth culture (including the network of rock stations across the nation). Withdrawal of identification from the existing system, with the incongruence between its announced values and its actual responses, led to the development of alternative political value structures and consequent redefinition of political concepts and norms.

Not only was the concept of community subject to a reevaluation, but also the concepts of law and justice, democracy, and social change: "...the current interpretations of law and crime were no longer tenable... This led to new analyses of the problems and social situation in America, which inevitably led to new conceptions for effecting and directing social change" (Section I, p. 29). In other words, new ideologies began to emerge.

The challenge of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party at the 1964 Democratic National Convention, which was based on values that the political system was presumed to honor and realize, was a test of trust and efficacy in the system and its officeholders by black activists and their white allies. The negative outcome of their efforts sharply increased estrangement from the national political system, particularly for activist blacks; for white students this occurred with the election with activist support of Lyndon Johnson's policy of no escalation in Vietnam and his subsequent reversal. The Free Speech Movement originated in local grievances over policies of university authorities, but its rhetoric rapidly generalized to express estrangement from the political and social system as a whole ("the machine"). In the process it initiated the first challenges to the legitimacy of university authority in terms of broader

political rights and values, which students were beginning to conceive as relevant to their status as well as the status of adulthood and thus a basis for value conflict with university governance structures.

The emergence of the Black and Third World perspective challenged the cultural values as well as structural features in American society, at least as they relate to race, and hence questioned the viability of the social and political community itself. The emphasis this view places on self-worth, dignity, and liberation from social oppression through consciousness and awareness of personal and cultural dignity is expressed through a vision of structural and cultural reforms for the community and blacks as a group within it, rather than for the individual. So far only fringe organizations advocate separatism, a form of complete alienation from the existing societal community.

The transcendental perspective seems to represent the manifestation of deep changes relevant for the societal community as a whole on a quasi-religious level, dealing with fundamental values, life styles, and world view. According to our previous analysis, the emergence of these activities in their religious rather than tension-relieving role marks the depth of the challenge to and the needed change of the existing culture.

As these two perspectives emerged and gained strength, the profound estrangement from the existing social and cultural order (alienation) which was developing motivated alienated reformers to the series of "tests" of the system's values and efficacy so as to determine whether any identification with the polity or its justifying values could be maintained. During this period, the election of Richard Nixon created increased perceptions of inefficacy, including some beginning beliefs that radical protests might generate more backlash than positive effect. On the basis of the outcomes of these tests and perceptions, a number of responses began to develop, reflecting both the behavioral orientations of the participants

and the typical multiplicity of ideological perspectives in a transitional period: "drop out in protest" (withdrawal), "reform institutions" (reformism), and "destroy the system" (revolution). These were interrupted, however, by the Cambodia-Kent State crisis, when an acceleration of the loss of faith occurred among many who had stayed outside the counter-culture. The result was a great influx of "moderates" whose behavioral orientation was baiscally reformist rather than revolutionary. Immediately thereafter, the "backlash" to the immense wave of demonstrations on college campuses and the attempted "reconstitution" of the universities convinced the great majority of students that radicalism as it had developed to that point was proving ineffective. Consequently, the "loss of faith" extended to the radical student movement itself, which began to disintegrate as former activists, despairing of the efficacy of any action in altering national policy, moved toward a less active political orientation. Simultaneously, the failure of newly mobilized reformists to make any visible impact on national policy, together with their perception of inefficacy of alternatives, caused the reformists to withdraw from their expected political activity: they did not mobilize as expected for the 1970 elections. A survey by Daniel Yankelovitch and Associates (see Volume II) taken at this period of withdrawal noted that a near-majority of students questioned said that fundamental changes were needed (in effect, that they felt a fundamental value conflict with the existing system) but far fewer reported willingness to participate in reformist activities toward that end. Rather than an expression of laziness or hypocrisy, such statements probably indicate the lack of effectiveness that many students saw in reformist efforts.

The states of mind which are suggested in Section I and emerged through this period of loss of faith represent different orientations and ideological positions on change and the means to achieve it. Those who "drop out" and turn inward to construct their own commitments have become

alienated from the society as a whole and its institutionalized values, and thus experiment with cultural and social alternatives in order to regain orientation. However, the spread of much religious and quasi-religious experimentation--including the "human potential movement"--into all levels of society in recent years indicates the presence of significant cultural strain among those still maintaining participant orientations. "Person-changing" represents an operationalization of this experimentation in the service of social change.

"Infuse the system" constitutes a return to conventional reformist means but with countercultural ends, which has been triggered by the perception of the inefficacy of direct action. Such action has been perceived to mobilize counteraction in the name of "preserving the social order" to such an extent as to threaten the survival of those desiring change. Similarly, there has recently been a withdrawal from the revolutionist positions of "destroy the system" and "overthrow the government."

Finally, those who favor "repression of subversives" desire to maintain or have restored the threated validity of their values and orientation in the society; to achieve this they perceive it necessary to resist attempts at social change. As we shall see, they are often culturally and socially disoriented, and perceive cultural innovations to be as threatening and subversive as social protest. Their desire for stability and coherence has frequently taken the form of legal actions to place great disadvantages on those who desire to experiment with alternative life-styles.

## The Nature of Future Change

It would appear from this account that contemporary radicalism in the United States has followed a course which is substantially explained by the theory presented earlier. In addition, the research results on the personal characteristics of those who have been most active in the student

movement (Section I, pp. 21-22) are in full accord with the theoretical hypotheses of Schwartz .

The most significant features of this account, however, would seem to include not only the wide range of issues and participants involved but also the importance of cultural elements--values, beliefs, life-styles, world view, religious and quasi-religious activities focussing on these--and associated methodologies in the operation and outlook of the reformist and radical movements of the counterculture. These factors, when laid against the theoretical framework presented above, tend to confirm a view that the current situation facing this nation may be not a temporary deviation from continuous, surprise-free development but rather a more fundamental challenge of unknown proportions, a successful response to which will require changes in some of the central elements of the cultural value system underlying our society and a consequent transformation of structure and purpose of many of our institutions.

The difference between these two views of the future--the conventional extrapolation of the present vs. a fundamental transformation of societal institutions--is obviously of the greatest importance for policy research. Consequently, the determination of the strength of the case for a "transformational" view and some indication of the nature of the value change needed to restore vitality to American society will be the focus of the third section of this report, leading off Volume II. Then, placing these results against an extension of the framework developed above, a set of alternative futures to the year 2000 are developed in schematic form as expressions of the alternative interpretations and resolutions of the current situation and as contexts in which different policies can be compared.

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26. Parsons, Talcott, "Some Reflections on the Place of Force in Social Process," in Internal War, Problems and Approaches, Harry Eckstein (ed.), Free Press, New York, 1964

27. Definition adapted from Nieburg, H. L., Political Violence, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1969

28. Gamson, William A., Power and Discontent, The Dorsey Press, Homewood, Illinois, 1968

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30. Influence may be attempted in a system using a number of different means. The four used here have been identified by Parsons (Ref. 26, p. 39):
    - Inducement--the addition of new advantages to the situation faced by authorities or the promise to do sc contingent on their decisions.
    - Constraint or coercion--the addition of new disadvantages to the situation or the threat to do so contingent on the decisions made.

- Persuasion--the offer of "good reasons" why it is in the "interest" of authorities to change their minds without adding anything to their situation. Successful persuasion may be based on the content of the influencer's argument (generating the conviction that it is valid), on faith in the expertise or general wisdom of the influencer, or on the desire to please the influencer or avoid displeasing him.
- Activation of value-commitments--the threat or warning that it would not be "right" for the authorities not to change their minds, in terms of their own standards of right action. Here appeal to conscience is the prototypical case (Ref. 26, p. 39).

31. Schwartz, David C., Political Alienation and Political Behavior, Aldine Publishing Company, Chicago (forthcoming)

32. Parsons, Talcott, "On the Concept of Political Power," in Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, CVII, June 1963; reprinted in Parsons, Talcott, Politics and Social Structure, Free Press, New York, 1969, pp. 352-404

33. Political leadership entails taking responsibility for policy decisions that are not authorized specifically by the supporting constituency, justifying this extension of existing binding obligations in terms of the norms and values of the community, and "[transforming] the 'sentiment' that something ought to be done into a commitment to implement the sentiment by positive action, including coercive sanctions if necessary" (Ref. 32, p. 390).

34. Davies, James C., "Toward a Theory of Revolution," American Sociological Review, Vol. XXVII, pp. 5-19 (January 1962); also see Gurr, Ted Robert, Why Men Rebel, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1970

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42. Wallace, Anthony F. C., "Revitalization Movements," American Anthropologist, 58, pp. 264-81 (1956); reworded in Wallace, Anthony F. C., Culture and Personality, 2d ed., Random House, New York, 1970

43. Tiryakian, E. A., "A Model of Societal Change and Its Lead Indicators," in The Study of Total Societies, Samuel Z. Kalusner (ed.), Doubleday and Company, Inc., Anchor Books, Garden City, New York, 1967. The author is indebted to Tiryakian's analysis of the latency sector as illuminating the sub rosa processes of change in patterns of meaning and value in a society.

44. Tiryakian defines a "revolution" as "societal change," a short term radical transformation of the social order (political or economic) whether accomplished with or without violence. See Tiryakian, E. A., "A Model of Societal Change and Its Lead Indicators," in The Study of Total Societies, Samuel Z. Kalusner (ed.), Doubleday and Company, Inc., Anchor Books, Garden City, New York, 1967

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46. Passage modified from Tiryakian, E. A., pp. 93-94. "A Model of Societal Change and Its Lead Indicators," in The Study of Total Societies, Samuel Z. Kalusner (ed.), Doubleday and Company, Inc., Anchor Books, Garden City, New York, 1967. Tiryakian points out in

the original that historically this lead indicator has been associated especially with the flaunting of sexual promiscuity in public life.

47. This description is adapted from the definition of political alienation in Schwartz, David C., Political Alienation and Political Behavior, Aldine Publishing Company, Chicago (forthcoming), Chapter I Social Alienation characterized much of "middle America" in 1969; see Lemon, Richard, The Troubled America, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1970 (considered again in Volume II).

48. Schwartz, David C., "A Theory of Revolutionary Behavior," in When Men Revolt and Why, James Chowning Davies (ed.), Free Press, New York, 1971, pp. 109-32

49. Mitchell, William C., The American Polity, Free Press, New York, 1962

50. Schwartz, David C., Political Alienation and Political Behavior, Aldine Publishing Company, Chicago (forthcoming). This work contains extensive and convincing empirical verification of the major hypotheses underlying this summary account. Since many of these propositions are at variance with much contemporary theorizing on alienation and its relation to political behavior, the readers will gain an appreciation of the theoretical and empirical contribution Schwartz has made only by consulting the original work, described in the book itself.

51. Schwartz, David C., Political Alienation and Political Behavior, Aldine Publishing Company, Chicago (forthcoming); the same variables are presented in Ref. 48, which contains a detailed description of the process of political alienation. Consequently, we refer the reader to Ref. 48 for details, particularly for the theoretical framework developed from cognitive dissonance theory.

52. Schwartz, David C., Political Alienation and Political Behavior, Aldine Publishing Company, Chicago (forthcoming). Schwartz states:

> We reason that fundamental value conflicts between self and and polity (both highly valued objects) are threatening, because perceived cognitive conflict, when it involves salient objects, tends to be threatening; because, also, such conflicts function as a locus for the fixation of free-floating anxiety; and because a distantiation from one's organized society may induce a separation anxiety.

53. Merton, Robert K., "Social Structure and Anomie," in Social Theory and Social Structure, Free Press of Glencoe, Glencoe, Illinois, 1957

54. Schwartz, David C., Political Alienation and Political Behavior, Aldine Publishing Company, Chicago (forthcoming). On the effects of the process of alienation, Schwartz writes:

> Contrast, for example, Mr. Jones who is characterized by a highly threatening politicized value conflict and then comes to regard himself and the polity as inefficacious with Mr. Smith, who acquires the perception of PI and SI first and only then becomes aware of a threatening political value conflict. Mr. Jones is at first likely to adopt a reformist orientation, seeking to reduce the TVC, but later to find that the added PI and SI, which move him in the direction of alienated attitudes, also move him, at least in the short run, toward a less active mode of political orientation (perhaps withdrawal or ritualistic reformism). Mr. Smith, ceterus paribus, would probably have first adopted a fairly conventional or passive orientation to politics because he felt himself inefficacious and the polity to be immovable and because, in the absence of TVC he felt nothing to goad him to political activity: for him, the addition of TVC may well destabilize this orientation and make him at least potentially available for more active alienated behavior.

In addition:

> Individuals who become alienated as part of a group should be systematically more extreme (either more active or more passive) in their behavioral orientations than are people who become alienated without such group attachments, because of the operation of group reinforcement processes.

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57. Schwartz, David C., "A Theory of Revolutionary Behavior," in When Men Rebel and Why, James C. Davies (ed.), Free Press, New York, 1971. Schwartz comments:

> The modern sectors of most political systems emit a more or less steady bombardment of symbols about themselves and, therefore, some evidences of government (and its nonsupport of basic values) will inevitably get through the perceptual screens of individuals who are receptive to, or tied to, the communications media. By and large it is the urbanized intelligentsia who are most closely wedded to the media, whose attention to the channels of modern communications must be regular if not continuous, and hence it is that political withdrawal is least effective for intellectuals (p. 119).

58. Many authors discuss the requirements and dynamics of revolutionary organization. Rather than attempt to lay out an analysis here, which would not suit our purpose, we refer the interested reader to the extensive literature on the subject. A good start is the recent collection of articles by James C. Davies (ed.), When Men Rebel and Why, Free Press, New York, 1971.

59. Schwartz, David C., "A Theory of Revolutionary Behavior," in When Men Rebel and Why, James C. Davies (ed.), Free Press, New York, 1971; compare Johnson, Chalmers, Revolution and the Social System, Stanford University: The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, Hoover Institution Studies 3, pp. 5-11 (1964).

60. Johnson, Chalmers, Revolutionary Change, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1966; Johnson points out that:

> . . . this leads to psychological reductionism, a refusal to distinguish between acts of political violence that are in response to the needs of an abnormal personality (as defined by particular equilibrated social system) and acts of political violence that are in response to personal tensions generated in adults by a disequilibrated social system (p. 77).

Thus the increase in antisocial behaviors (as defined by the system) and the loss of normative coherence of a society in dissynchronization lead to extensive controversies, particularly acute when (1) certain of such behaviors become identified with the attitude of social and political estrangement, and (2) protest behaviors involving civil disobedience or violence become more frequent.

61. Many of these indicators are related more closely to the framework of alienation and its consequences in Schwartz, David C., "A Theory of revolutionary Behavior," in When Men Rebel and Why, James C. Davies (ed.), Free Press, New York, 1971. The list is compiled from the analyses of previous writers on societal transformation, e.g., Pettee, George S., The Process of Revolution, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1938; Brinton, Crane, The Anatomy of Revolution, 3d ed., Prentice-Hall, Inc., Vintage Books, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1965; Edwards, Lyford P., The Natural History of Revolution, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1927; Hopper, Rex D., "The Revolutionary Process," Social Forces, Vol. 28, pp. 270-79 (1950); Kornhauser, William, Politics of Mass Society, Free Press of Glencoe, Glencoe, Illinois, 1959; Johnson, Chalmers, Revolution and the Social System, Stanford University: The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, Hoover Institution Studies 3, pp. 5-11 (1964); Johnson, Chalmers, Revolutionary Change, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1966.

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63. Hopper, Rex D., "The Revolutionary Process," Social Process, Vol. 28, pp. 270-79 (1950); Hopper terms this "The Milling Process," quoted in Ref. 48, p. 117.

64. Edwards, Brinton, Hopper, and Johnson all point this out. See, for example, Johnson, Chalmers, Revolutionary Change, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1966, pp. 75-77, 181-2.

65. Flacks, Richard, "The Liberated Generation: An Exploration of the Roots of Student Protest," J. Soc. Issues, Vol. 23, pp. 52-75 (1967).